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ABSTRACT 
 
 
D’ANGELO, NICHOLAS J.  In Reckless Pursuit: Barry 
Goldwater, A Team of Amateurs 
and the Rise of Conservatism 
 
Department of History, Union College, June 2014 
ADVISOR: Andrew J. Morris, Ph.D. 
 
 
Before 1964, Barry Goldwater had never lost an election. In fact, despite 
being the underdog in both of his U.S. Senate elections in Arizona, in 1952 and 1958, 
he defied the odds and won. His keen ability for organization, fundraising and 
strategy was so widely respected that his Republican colleagues appointed the 
freshman senator to chair their campaign committee in 1955, with conservatives and 
liberals alike requesting his aid during contentious elections. Goldwater himself 
adamantly believed that in politics, “organization is the whole secret.” For all of these 
reasons, 1964 seems to be an outlier in the senator’s expansive career. The core 
qualities of detail, focus and organization present throughout his life were 
conspicuously absent during the 1964 presidential campaign.  
This thesis addresses the question of why Goldwater was unable to succeed in 
his quest for the presidency, focusing on the roles of ideology and organization. It is a 
common belief that Goldwater’s conservative ideology was the primary reason for his 
defeat, but this thesis instead argues that a lack of effective campaign strategy, 
coupled with poor organization and leadership, was responsible for Goldwater’s 
failed presidential bid. In strong contrast to his campaigns for the United States 
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Senate, Goldwater demonstrated uncharacteristic reluctance to run in 1964, as well as 
an overdependence on individuals who were simply unqualified for a national 
campaign. The thesis explores these areas in both the primary and general election 
campaigns to argue that it was the lack of an effective campaign organization, not 
merely his political ideology, which led to Goldwater’s landslide loss.  
Research is based on a combination of contemporary media coverage of the 
campaign, memoirs of instrumental Goldwater aides, and archival documentation. 
Research was conducted using the collection of Personal & Political Papers of Barry 
M. Goldwater housed at the Hayden Library of Arizona State University, as well as 
the Goldwater Papers and the Papers of Congressman William E. Miller at Cornell 
University.	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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Barry Morris Goldwater was a detail-oriented organizer, a planner in all 
regards and mostly predictable. During his three decades in the United States Senate, 
he rarely strayed from his standard lunch: A deluxe cheeseburger and a chocolate 
milkshake, eaten alone at his desk. In 1964, his campaign plane was under strict 
orders to serve it, and the tradition continued until his triple bypass surgery in 1982.1 
Throughout his life, whether it was as a pilot, Phoenix businessman or U.S. Senator, 
Goldwater displayed a particular devotion to detail. During a single 3,750-mile flight 
as a World War II pilot, Goldwater kept a thirty-six-page diary, carefully recording 
every aspect of his mission, the intricate machinery of his P-47 and his solemn 
recognition of the dangerous overseas journey.2  
His unyielding conservative philosophy was no different. From his first public 
statements in a 1938 Phoenix Evening Gazette article to his final years in the United 
States Senate in the 1980s, Goldwater’s conservatism remained simple and 
predictable. Focused on the individual as an agent of change, a limited role for 
government and entrepreneurism as the driver of American innovation, 
“Goldwaterism” was straightforward, as was the senator’s overall conduct. Sandra 
Day O’Connor, who credited Goldwater with her successful confirmation to the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1981, described his mindset as black-and-white: “He was either for 
you, or not,” she said.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lee Edwards, Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 
1995), 67. 
2 Ibid., 25. 
3 Julie Anderson, Mr. Conservative: Goldwater on Goldwater (2006; Sweet Pea Films, 2007), Film. 
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 Goldwater’s personality and ideology had served him well before 1964. He 
had never lost an election, despite waging three uphill campaigns beginning in 1949. 
As the underdog in his U.S. Senate elections in 1952 and 1958 he defied the odds. His 
keen ability for organization, fundraising and strategy was so widely respected that 
his Republican colleagues appointed the freshman senator chair of their campaign 
committee in 1955, with conservatives and liberals within the party requesting his aid 
during contentious elections.4 Goldwater himself adamantly believed that in politics, 
“organization is the whole secret.”5 However, the core qualities of detail, focus and 
organization present throughout his life were conspicuously absent during the 1964 
presidential campaign. For all of these reasons, 1964 seems to be an outlier in the 
senator’s expansive career. 
  While an efficient organization may have been lacking in the 1964 campaign, 
the signature Goldwater ideology was not. Instead, 1964 in many ways signified the 
beginning of the rise of conservatism in national politics, marking a major milestone 
in the philosophy’s identity within the Republican Party. Conservative columnist 
George Will wrote, “We who voted for him in 1964 believe he won, it just took 16 
years to count the votes.”6 In 1964, however, that ideology seemed to be summarily 
rejected by the national electorate. The massive defeat of Goldwater at the hands of 
President Lyndon Johnson surely shaped our understanding of the arc of postwar 
conservatism and liberalism.  
 The historiography on Goldwater has gone through several eras, which 
aligned with the changing political context of the period. Immediately following 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Robert Alan Goldberg, Barry Goldwater (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 109. 
5 Ibid., 161. 
6 George F. Will, “The Cheerful Malcontent,” The Washington Post, May 31, 1998. 
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Goldwater’s defeat in 1964, contemporary observers interpreted the loss as a rejection 
of Goldwater’s “radical” ideology by the public. But as conservatism became more 
palatable to the American electorate, the interpretation of Goldwater’s candidacy also 
began to shift. With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, historians began to 
deeply analyze the divided sects of the Republican Party that contributed to the 
advancement of the conservative ideology, a narrative that is largely told through the 
Goldwater candidacy.  
While Reagan’s election certainly legitimized the conservative philosophy, it 
was not until the Republican capture of Congress in 1994 that analysts began to more 
fully appreciate the role Barry Goldwater played in conservatism’s popular rise. It is 
no coincidence that the two longest biographies of Goldwater, largely sympathetic 
portrayals, were written in 1995. It was this changing political context that allowed 
the opportunity for historians to more fully examine and scrutinize the long-held 
assumptions regarding the 1964 campaign. Today, the continuing evolution of the 
scholarship, as well as the modern political context, allows for the opportunity to 
further reevaluate the role of ideology in the election of 1964, challenging the 
arguments that generations of historians have made on the subject. While many 
scholarly works have dealt with Goldwater’s ideology in comparison to campaigns 
that would follow, few have analyzed it in relation to his past campaigns. In addition, 
those past campaigns can also further explain Goldwater’s weak organization during 
the presidential election. Just as 1964 has become valuable to explaining the victories 
in 1980 and beyond, Goldwater’s U.S. Senate campaigns in 1952 and 1958 can shed 
significant light on the reasons for the candidate’s overwhelming loss. In this context, 
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the roles of ideology and organization in the 1964 campaign can help to better 
understand the chronology of conservatism. Moreover, an examination of the role of 
organization within the 1964 Goldwater campaign can be more fully dissected in a 
way that has been largely unexplored by past scholarship, showing that the loss was 
not based solely on ideology.  
Contemporary observers of the 1964 presidential election reiterated the 
reactions of the popular press, casting conservatism, and Goldwater, as paranoid, 
destructive and fanatic. During the campaign, and immediately after it, journalists and 
scholars vilified the Republican nominee as a radical whose ideology was simply too 
extreme to be acceptable to the American populace. Contemporaries noted 
Goldwater’s colorful expression of his political philosophy as the driving force 
behind his own defeat, concluding that the basic principles of his ideology were 
therefore misplaced. In 1965, some scholars, including political scientist Irving 
Crespi, considered the Goldwater movement as a natural branch of McCarthyism, 
thereby tainting the acceptability of conservatism.7 Writing in 1969, David 
Halberstam blamed Goldwater’s ideology for driving “Americans back to political 
divisions.”8 Sheila Koeppen described the conservative cause as an obsession with 
“conspiracy,” while Theodore White referred to the Goldwater movement as one built 
of pending “resentments, anger, frustrations” and fears within the Republican Party.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Irving Crespi, “The Structural Basis for Right-Wing Conservatism: The Goldwater Case,” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter, 1965-66), 523. 
8 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House Publishing, 1969), 402.	  
9 Sheila R. Koeppen, “The Radical Right,” American Academy of Political and Social Science 382 
(March 1969): 72; Theodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Antheneum 
Publishers, 1965), 92. 
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Above all, contemporary accounts ascertained that the Radical Right, defined 
as the John Birch Society and Ku Klux Klan, and synonymous with Goldwater’s 
conservatism, was “a distorted and unrealistic response to Communism” rooted in 
obsessive anti-intellectualism.10 Scholars saw the foundations of “radical right” 
conservatism in prior political movements, drawing particular links to the Populism 
of the 1890s and the radicalism championed by Huey Long and Father Coughlin 
during the Great Depression. Like those causes, conservatism was assumed to be both 
marginal and undesirable.11 Moreover, radical conservatism was viewed as simply a 
response to the social reforms of the New Deal, “expressing not poverty, but sudden 
prosperity, biting the New Deal hand that fed it.”12 
Shortly after the 1964 election, election analysts included Goldwater 
campaign hands and contemporary journalists writing for markedly different 
purposes. Most agreed on the principal weaknesses within the campaign though, 
including the campaign insiders who provided the greatest insight. Stephen Shadegg, 
who served as Goldwater’s campaign manager during his successful U.S. Senate 
campaigns, and F. Clifton White, responsible for the grassroots draft movement, both 
chronicled the handicaps of the campaign organization and ineffectiveness of 
Goldwater’s inexperienced staff.13 Shadegg wrote that the 1964 campaign as a whole 
was “a complete contradiction” to the Goldwater candidacies in 1952 and 1958, 
which he was intimately involved in. Goldwater demonstrated reluctance in running, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), 23; Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right. 1963. (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), xiv. 
11Bell, ed., 3. 
12 Ibid., 163. 
13 Stephen Shadegg, What Happened to Goldwater? (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 
10-1.	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a distrust of the media he had always enjoyed, and a suspicion of intellectuals he had 
previously admired.14 Shadegg faults the campaign staff for these inconsistencies.15 
White’s main focus is the elaborate strategy his team had developed in order to 
guarantee the nomination for Goldwater at the national convention in July 1964, a 
level of attention to detail that was largely absent during both the primary and general 
election campaigns.16 
It is not surprising that Shadegg and Clif White provide few comments on the 
negative role of ideology. They were among the earliest converts to the Goldwater 
philosophy, and hardened salesmen by 1964. For them, the failures of the campaign 
could not have rested on the beliefs, but the imperfect campaign structure. However, 
White does comment on the elements that allowed political opponents to effectively 
brand the Goldwater ideology, transforming it into the warmongering, bigoted 
militarism that became identified with Goldwater. White and Shadegg both conclude 
that the “extremist” label attributed to Goldwater’s ideology was due, in no small 
part, to the candidate himself and his amateur, insulated, staff. Commenting on 
Goldwater’s acceptance speech, Shadegg writes that Goldwater “emphasized the 
dissension which his critics had been saying all along he meant to achieve,” further 
casting his right-wing philosophy as something that was both dangerous and 
unnatural.17 
While the organization was not a major focus for contemporary scholars, 
Goldwater’s poor campaign staff and weak strategy were still noted as components of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 78-9. 
15 Ibid., 173, 185. 
16 F. Clifton White, Suite 3505: The Story of the Draft Goldwater Movement (New Rochelle, NY: 
Arlington House, 1967), 98. 
17 Ibid., 167.	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his ultimate failure. In 1968, political scientists Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith 
dissected the organizations of both Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson, offering 
one of the most complete analyses of Goldwater’s defeat. They concluded that 
Goldwater made decisions early in his campaign “which seemed quite at odds with 
common assumptions about how political decisions should be organized and made.”18 
Goldwater’s operation was defined as a “comprehensive” model, a centralized 
hierarchy based on complete rationality in decision-making.19 While the model 
stressed the dual campaign staff that generally defined the 1964 Goldwater campaign, 
the efficiency purported by the model never materialized. 
Offering a third strand of analysis, Lamb and Smith blame the inefficiency of 
the organization on Goldwater himself, specifically his reluctance to seek the 
presidency, another variable central to understanding the election defeat. The 
comprehensive model requires advanced planning and constant communication, 
neither of which was possible because of Goldwater’s hesitance in declaring his 
candidacy. While he accepted his role as leader of the conservative movement, Lamb 
and Smith argue he was “more a captive than a leader.”20 Moreover, Lamb and Smith 
argue that Goldwater’s ideology was hardly different from that of previous 
Republican presidential candidate. Had it not been for “a few stark phrases,” the 
political scientists believe he could have represented “the ideological center” of the 
Republican Party.21 Lamb and Smith offer a strong foundation for the arguments of 
this thesis, but their work occurred so early that it was unable to account for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith, Campaign Decision-Making: The Presidential Election of 1964 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), vi. 
19 Ibid., 20. 
20 Ibid., 67-9, 88. 
21 Ibid., 91.	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shifting interpretations of the conservative ideology. In this context, the shortcomings 
of the organization can be reexamined and more fully understood. 
This was a minority view at the time. Journalists covering the election 
certainly disagreed that Goldwater represented any ideological center. Robert Novak 
argued that Goldwater’s capture of the nomination and the collapse of the Eastern 
Establishment led to the “disastrous conclusion” in November, which was 
“foredoomed” by the contentious primary season.22 Goldwater’s blunt sincerity, 
according to Novak, translated into “ideological inflexibility that would have 
profound implications for his party.”23 But Goldwater’s ideology, although 
potentially damaging to the party, was exactly what Novak credited Goldwater’s 
nomination to. The “die-hard delegates” had fought their way to San Francisco 
because of Barry Goldwater, a fact Clif White repeated often.24 Novak makes clear 
that Goldwater’s organization was hardly made up of “supermen,” and was not the 
“invincible machine” the post-convention media portrayed it as, despite White’s 
impressive efforts.25 Similar to Shadegg, Novak sharply criticizes the amateur 
operation in the general election. To Novak, Goldwater’s victory was not based on 
contentious strategy or shrewd campaigning, but pure politics. Although he had 
inspired a movement, Goldwater had also created an “atmosphere of mutual 
mistrust.”26 In this sense, his defeat is attributed to Republicans’ internal divisions.  
After these immediate reflections on the campaign, interest in Goldwater’s 
impact on the national political landscape was largely subdued. But by the 1980s, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Robert Novak, The Agony of the GOP 1964 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 6. 
23 Ibid., 269. 
24 Ibid., 444. 
25 Ibid., 467.	  
26 Ibid., 5. 
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conservatism was truly legitimized. Ronald Reagan’s election sparked new interest in 
the origins of the conservative movement, indicated by a sharp rise in publications, 
including Barry Goldwater’s memoir, Goldwater, in 1988. A serious reflection of his 
candidacy, the memoir offers a frank account of Goldwater’s personal feelings 
through his 1964 campaign. Perhaps most revealing was his personal motivation for 
staffing decisions. While he understood he needed Clif White’s help, Goldwater 
writes, White was never someone he was particularly comfortable with simply 
because they did not know each other. Moreover, Goldwater simply was uninterested 
in the “jockeying for power” that exists in a national campaign. Yearning for a 
“campaign above reproach,” he attempted to neutralize the “politics as usual” by 
surrounding himself with close friends he trusted had his best interest.27 
Recognizing the long-term ramifications of the palpable shift in 1964, 
historians began to more fully analyze the Republican Party’s “greater emphasis on 
ideology.”28 The philosophy of Goldwater was still referred to as the “radical right,” 
but also re-analyzed as “‘new’ conservatism,” which had never before been tested on 
a national scale.29 Contemporary scholars had blamed Goldwater’s ideological purity 
for the party’s disunity, and while that criticism was still largely maintained, an 
emerging group began to amend that understanding. Historians like Nicol Rae 
criticized liberal Republicans for failing to articulate a counter ideology based in 
deep-rooted conviction.30 In addition, Rae blamed the organization of liberal 
Republicans for “tactical errors” and a “fragile foundation” that led to Goldwater’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Barry M Goldwater with Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 164-5. 
28 Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans: From 1952 to Present (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 3. 
29 Ibid., 48, 53. 
30 Ibid., 61. 
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nomination.31 The Goldwater organization also became more fully appreciated with 
Clif White’s initial effort seen as “successful in mobilizing local supporters” and 
illustrative of “the effectiveness of the activist-oriented campaign.”32 
In 1995, when Republicans took control of Congress for the first time in a 
generation, the permanence and significance of conservatism was first fully 
appreciated. Historians since have consistently looked to Barry Goldwater to 
understand the rise of conservatism and the changing interpretations of its history. 
Goldwater has received more attention than many of his colleagues in the United 
States Senate, on either side of the aisle, including legendary legislators who were 
more active or productive members of Congress. Moreover, Goldwater has been more 
fully examined than any other losing presidential aspirant in the twentieth century, 
surpassing even his well-known predecessor William Jennings Bryan. The reason, as 
political consultant James Carville put it, is that Barry Goldwater was not just another 
presidential candidate. He sparked a powerful, well-respected movement.33 While 
Goldwater was largely softened due to the shifting political mainstream, ideology was 
still generally emphasized as a primary factor for his defeat. Scholars continued to 
purport that Goldwater’s most obvious failings were his “rigid conservatism and 
unrestrained manner.”34  
The interpretation of Goldwater did not change drastically, but it was 
chronicled in greater detail. Goldwater’s brand of conservatism was still seen as part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 69-70 
32 Ibid., 55. 
33 Anderson. 
34 Jeffrey J. Matthews, “To Defeat a Maverick: The Goldwater Candidacy Revisited, 1963-1964,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, Rules of the Game: How to Play the Presidency (Fall, 
1997), 662. 
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of the rising movement “to turn back the central institutions and the reigning ideas of 
New Deal liberalism, and revive and age of laissez-faire.”35 Still, more sophisticated 
explanations were developing. Brennan referred to Goldwater’s “unabashedly 
conservative philosophy” as a major problem for his campaign because it tainted his 
overall public image and made it easy for opponents to “portray him as an 
extremist.”36  
Goldwater’s personal style was increasingly separated from ideology as well. 
Scholars began to argue that Goldwater aided his enemies by basing a platform on 
vague “generalities” and allowing the party to rupture, making his ideology appear 
more extremist than it may have actually been.37 The benefits of that approach were 
also seen though. Goldwater was viewed as a catalyst to expand the party base 
beyond business supporters and conservative activists by “wooing white voters in the 
North and South.”38 The 1964 campaign strategy yielded significant Republican gains 
in the South even while the overall campaign organization largely crumbled. 
Regardless, historians continued to blame Goldwater’s loss on his inability to 
maintain the support of traditional Republican blocs due to his ideological agenda.39 
As late as 2002, Goldwaterism was still being portrayed as “radical,” further 
proof of the lasting impressions of the contemporary literature. In 2001, Lisa McGirr, 
who wrote on the concentration of Goldwater supporters in Orange County, 
California, noted the difficulty with these “pejorative labels that served in the past to 	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dismiss this movement.”40 With a refocus on the intellectual foundations of 
conservatism and the grassroots activists that made its national strength possible, 
scholars began to challenge the long-held notion that 1960s conservatism was simply 
a burst of radicalism. Rather, it was now seen as part of a larger intellectual 
movement that started with William F. Buckley Jr. and the National Review in 1955 
and Russell Kirk’s scholarly quarterly, Modern Age in 1957.41 These elements were 
mostly ignored by earlier historians, such as Hofstadter, demonstrating the changing 
views from the “previous understandings of American conservatism as ‘fringe’ or 
‘marginal.’”42 The Goldwater campaign was now understood as a learning experience 
that later helped the Right secure political dominance. “Despite his massive defeat,” 
Plotke wrote, “Goldwater’s campaign reduced the marginality of the radical right.”43  
Still, the extremist label had not been completely eliminated from modern 
scholarship. Whitney Strub writes that modern historians such as Robert Brent Toplin 
still employed the brand, particularly in works focusing on modern conservatism. 
Toplin argued in 2006 that conservatism remains “radical,” drawing comparisons 
between the conservatism of the 1960s and the continuing “‘militant, closed-minded 
expressions’ that undeniably characterize radcon thought” within the George W. Bush 
administration.44 Such interpretations simply do not constitute the majority trend 
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though, with many historians arguing that Goldwater’s ideology must be viewed 
differently now due to the changing political landscape.  
Overhauling the existing assumptions of ideology in Goldwater’s defeat, Rick 
Perlstein drew largely on the foundation provided through the major biographies by 
Edwards and Goldberg, offering a new interpretation. In the context of rising social 
conservatism, Perlstein argued Goldwater’s ideology became even easier to digest. In 
retrospect, “Mr. Conservative” did not seem all that conservative at all. In 2006, 
Walter Cronkite even went so far as to suggest that Goldwater had actually become a 
liberal.45 An overall sympathetic portrayal, Perlstein writes extensively about the 
unfair treatment Goldwater received from the Democrats and especially the press.46 In 
this context, analyses like Perlstein’s have shown greater kindness to the Goldwater 
ideology, a demonstration of the significant softening of the Goldwater legacy. An 
ardent liberal, Perlstein defends Goldwater throughout his work, blaming media bias 
for making the Goldwater ideology unpopular. In fact, the media, asserts Perlstein, 
actually began to believe the extremist charges against Goldwater and “their 
objectivity began failing them,” making the campaign coverage “one of the most 
dramatic failures of collective discernment in the history of American journalism.”47 
Perlstein’s work also added to the increased attention to poor organizational choices 
as an element of Goldwater’s defeat.48 Perlstein contends that while it was obvious 
that the grassroots efforts Clif White had developed were “rare and marvelous,” 
Goldwater never took advantage of them, relying solely on the inexperience of close 	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friends.49 Within a more modern context, Perlstein focuses on the lasting effects of 
Goldwater’s ideology, rather than its initial handicaps in 1964. 
The rise of the Tea Party movement in 2010 led to another spike in writings 
on Goldwater’s presidential campaign, with his ideology further analyzed and related 
to social issues that have become increasingly important to a modern conservative 
agenda. Shermer and others focused on Goldwater’s political views as related to 
women and civil rights, providing a new analysis of Goldwater’s conservative 
philosophy and his strategy in articulating it. Seen largely as a man before his time, it 
has also become widely accepted that Goldwater was a bellwether to conservatism. 
Nickerson notes that the themes of law and order, embraced by Goldwaterism, did not 
become popular political issues until 1968. Further, issues on social morality did not 
begin to grip the national political agenda until the early 1970s, with Goldwater as a 
precursor to, albeit not an active participant in, the rise of the Moral Majority.50 
Shermer further reflected on the foundation Goldwater provided for the conservative 
cause, embracing a “cowboy ethos” associated with examples of “western free-
enterprise Republicanism” that became a consistent theme for Ronald Reagan and 
George W. Bush.51 The simple belief in rugged individualism was a central 
component of Goldwaterism, and became a lasting element of the modern 
conservative philosophy. This “cowboy ethos,” celebrated by some modern 
historians, was the same philosophy labeled as “extremism” half a century ago. In a 
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modern context, Goldwater has become more mainstream as the national sentiment 
has experienced a center-right shift. 
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II. AN UNDEFEATED UNDERDOG 
 
 
 In 1952, Ernest McFarland was unbeatable. A veteran of World War I who 
had seen combat in the Navy, McFarland earned his law degree from Stanford 
University and won his first election in 1924. Over the course of fifteen years he 
served as an Arizona assistant attorney general, Pinal county attorney and county 
judge.1 Elected comfortably in 1940 to the United States Senate as a Democrat, he 
went on to capture nearly 70 percent of the vote in his 1946 reelection, despite Harry 
Truman’s growing unpopularity and Republicans gaining control of Congress for the 
first time in two decades.2 A legislative legend, he was a principal author of the G.I. 
Bill and a popular advocate for veterans’ benefits and expanded water projects vital to 
Arizona. Elected by his Senate peers as Majority Leader in 1951, and relatively 
young compared to them at fifty-eight, the chamber’s most powerful Democrat 
seemed assured of another sweeping victory.  
 Moreover, Arizona had not sent a Republican to the United States Senate 
since 1920. As late as 1950, Democrats outnumbered Republicans five-to-one in the 
Grand Canyon state and the party boasted 85 percent of the state’s registered voters as 
members.3 If anyone was going to win against McFarland, reasoned veteran Arizona 
campaign hand Stephen Shadegg, they would need 90 percent of Republican votes 
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and at least 25 percent of Democrats’.4 This was the formidable challenge that the 
political newcomer Barry M. Goldwater, a freshman Phoenix city councilman, 
accepted when he announced his candidacy on the steps of the Yavapai County 
Courthouse in his hometown of Prescott.5 
 Goldwater, who turned forty-three in 1952, embodied Arizona; his family had 
guided the infant territory to statehood, a feat achieved three years after his birth. 
Business entrepreneurs who recognized the importance of community enrichment, the 
Goldwater clan were devoted citizens who occasionally dipped into politics. Michael 
Goldwater, Barry’s grandfather and founder of Goldwater’s department store “set a 
high standard for community service,” donating substantial funding for railroads and 
telegraph lines linking their tiny hometown to Phoenix, the growing hub of the west.6 
Barry’s uncle, Morris, for whom he was named, was elected mayor of Prescott in 
1879 and would serve for forty-eight years, becoming an Arizona legend. Morris, a 
Democrat at a time when Republicans dominated the territorial government, helped 
organize the Arizona Democratic Party in the 1880s, building what his favorite 
nephew would look to tear down a generation later.7 
 But while Morris and many other Arizonans had identified with the 
Democratic Party, it was a wholly different party than the one which Barry would 
challenge. Considering themselves “Jeffersonian,” the Democrats of Morris’s 
generation were conservative believers in small government and individual liberty. 
New Deal liberalism would be a philosophical game changer that forced the 	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Goldwaters to reevaluate their party identity. Young Barry had accompanied Uncle 
Morris around the political circuit during his childhood and in 1938, as an adult, had 
made his own foray into the arena by challenging the New Deal in a Phoenix Evening 
Gazette op-ed. Criticizing the president for campaigning on reducing taxes and 
spending, Goldwater wrote that taxes had “increased 250 percent and I fear greatly 
that I ain’t seen nothin’ yet.”8 By the time Barry Goldwater was appointed to his first 
political office, as a member of the citizens’ committee to revise the Phoenix city 
charter in 1947, he was far from an amateur.9 In 1949, when a nonpartisan group of 
reform candidates looked to unseat the Phoenix City Council, the organizers found a 
strong candidate in the outspoken department store owner.  
 Goldwater masterfully used his decades of connections to boost his campaign. 
Goldwater had served as president of the Chamber of Commerce, chairman of the 
community chest, and a board member of the YMCA, an art museum and two 
hospitals. With his name recognition helping to boost the independent slate, 
Goldwater received three times as many votes as any other candidate. The 
“nonpartisan, broad-based clean up crew,” which included Jews, Mormons and a 
woman, won in every precinct.10 Mayor Nicholas Udall, the scion of a Democratic 
political family and the leader of the Reform ticket Goldwater won his Council seat 
on, aptly noted the “young merchant prince who liked to get his picture taken and fly 
airplanes” was surely destined for higher office.11 And, in fact, Goldwater was 
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already planning for it. Originally considered the front-runner for the Republican 
nomination for Governor of Arizona, he instead set his sights on the U.S. Senate.12  
While the notion of a newly minted councilman challenging the Senate 
Majority Leader might have seemed far-fetched, Goldwater was more than that. 
Chosen by his colleagues as the Council’s vice chair, Goldwater was the highest-
ranking Republican in the state in 1949.13 Over the next three years, Goldwater would 
continue to build his Rolodex of loyalists, while also hammering out an impressive 
record as a diligent reformer. He certainly had much to boast about: In a single year, 
the new City Council had reversed a $400,000 budget deficit into a $275,000 surplus, 
reduced the number of city departments by more than 50 percent, eliminated rampant 
corruption and boosted local business. In 1950, Look magazine and the National 
Municipal League honored Phoenix with the All-American City award, noting the 
impressive progress achieved through “intelligent citizen action.”14 Prominent 
Arizona Democrats, used to easy victories, clearly had something to fear from the 
bronzed cowboy who was quickly shaking up the Arizona political landscape. 
Beaming with confidence from the productive first year, Goldwater set out to 
expand his political machine, which would soon reinvigorate the state Republican 
Party. Radio host Howard Pyle, a Republican, announced that he would be a 
candidate for governor in 1950, and while historian Rick Perlstein refers to this as a 
“dirty trick” (as Goldwater had been seen as the presumptive nominee), Goldwater 
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took it in stride.15 A genuine loyalist, and recognizing an opportunity to strengthen 
the dormant Republican organization, Goldwater agreed to become Pyle’s campaign 
manager. For six months, Goldwater was the Republican Party, and introduced the 
state to unmatched political organization and discipline. Personally flying his 
candidate more than twenty-five thousand miles in his single-engine airplane, 
Goldwater handled scheduling, speechwriting and fundraising.16 The Goldwater style 
became synonymous with high energy and powerful charisma.17 
In contrast, Democratic nominee Ana Frohmiller, a pioneering female 
politician, was carelessly confident. One of the first women ever elected to statewide 
office, she had served as State Auditor since 1926. At the time of her nomination, it 
seemed she was destined to become the first female Governor of Arizona. But 
Frohmiller, certain in the authority of her party’s registration numbers, opened no 
campaign office, served as her own campaign manager and spent a measly $875. In 
the end, she lost the “red-hot Arizona gubernatorial race” by 3,000 votes out of 
195,000 cast.18 Howard Pyle became the first Republican governor since 1928, and 
“the handsome young campaign manager [who] usually upstaged the balding 
candidate” earned a statewide reputation as a disciplined organizer and gifted orator.19 
In 1951, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois visited Arizona. While his formal 
purpose was to address the state convention, his private mission was to convince 
Barry Goldwater to run for the U.S. Senate against Ernest McFarland. “I felt 
overwhelmed,” Goldwater wrote, “Here was a veteran national politician coming into 	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my home town, and he not only knew my name but suggested I run to help him in the 
Senate.”20 For all his imaginary astonishment, Goldwater had considered running for 
at least two years before Dirksen’s cocktail reception visit. He was deeply and 
genuinely disturbed by the national trend. Disgusted with New Deal-Fair Deal 
liberalism and disenchanted by Truman’s no-win war in Korea, Goldwater saw an 
opportunity to expand the ideological agenda of individual free enterprise. Even more 
disturbing to Goldwater was the conduct of incumbent Ernest McFarland, who he 
viewed as a “servile handmaiden” for the president obsessed with his own 
promotion.21 
Goldwater listed six reasons why he would enter the race in his campaign 
announcement: One, his “life-long familiarity” with the people and plights of 
Arizona; two, his belief in combating the “growth of the federal government;” three, 
his business acumen of “giving a dollar’s value to each dollar received;” four, his 
duty to fight the New Deal; five, an independent mind and his vow to never serve as 
“a mere rubber stamp for any administration;” and, finally, his overall opposition of 
the “‘present tragic trend toward the destruction’ of individual freedom.”22 The brief 
treatise served as Goldwater’s guiding mantra throughout the campaign, and 
encapsulated his life-long philosophy against “bureaucratic authority in 
Washington.”23 
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Friends had warned Goldwater that if “I ever opposed [McFarland], he’d saw 
me in half,” but Goldwater had his own reputation for tough politicking.24 As Robert 
F. Kennedy would write years later, “[Goldwater] could cut you to ribbons, slit your 
throat, but always in such a pleasant manner that you would have to like him.”25 And 
while Goldwater’s constant pledge was a campaign of principles, not personalities, 
there is no doubt that personality was partially responsible for his victory.26 After all, 
he had spent years cultivating his own powerful message and the skill with which to 
deliver it.  
Additionally, he surrounded himself with some of the most influential 
individuals in the state. Eugene Pulliam, a wealthy newspaper publicist originally 
from Dirksen’s home state of Illinois, had been a Goldwater ally since his City 
Council run. The owner of both the Phoenix Gazette and Arizona Republic, Pulliam 
guaranteed favorable press coverage from two of the state’s leading papers. In 
addition, Goldwater hired one of the state’s premier operatives, Stephen Shadegg, as 
his campaign manager. A registered Democrat until meeting Goldwater, Shadegg had 
managed veteran Democratic Senator Carl Hayden’s reelection effort in 1950.27 
Asked by Shadegg why he thought he could win, Goldwater depended solely on the 
power of his personality: “I can call ten thousand people in this state by their first 
name.”28 
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Goldwater’s success was due in part to his natural ability to build coalitions, a 
talent that would later be absent in his 1964 presidential campaign. While emerging 
Republicans in other states quarreled in an attempt to balance the 1952 feud between 
the conservatism of Senator Robert Taft and the moderation of General Dwight 
Eisenhower, Goldwater played both sides. Although sympathetic to Taft’s ideology, 
Goldwater recognized Eisenhower’s influence and engineered a deal to give the war 
hero a healthy representation within the Arizona delegation to the national 
convention.29 This brokering won Goldwater widespread appeal within the party. He 
faced little opposition in the primary, allowing him to focus squarely on McFarland, 
and both Taft and Eisenhower traveled to Arizona to campaign for him.30 
Furthermore, Shadegg urged Goldwater that he needed to create a full slate of 
candidates in order to energize Republicans to turn out in the colossal number he 
would need for victory. Republican voters had been typically denied the ability to 
vote a straight ticket in Arizona, but Goldwater convinced forty of the state’s young 
professionals to run for office, filling candidacies for every statewide offices. 
Coalescing an infant party from scratch, Goldwater crisscrossed the state, building 
momentum, as well as an intricate network of loyalists.31 In the process, Goldwater 
also worked to supply his campaign with an impressive war chest. Harry Rosenzweig, 
a close personal friend and the finance guru behind the Phoenix city council 
campaign, filled the campaign coffers using Goldwater’s sizeable list of 
acquaintances.32 More than half of Goldwater’s $45,000 came from the generous out-	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of-state donations of wealthy conservatives and the Republican Senatorial Campaign 
Committee covered nearly 16 percent of the expenses.33 
The 1952 campaign exemplified Goldwater’s discipline. The candidate rarely 
strayed from his core message, and although Shadegg had written every word of his 
carefully tailored speeches, Goldwater himself served as a devoted architect of his 
own ideology.34 Announcing his candidacy in an April 24, 1952 press release before 
the May convention, Goldwater wasted no time in crafting his oft, repeated campaign 
theme: “I am an Arizonan who doesn’t like the spectacle of our junior senator, who 
instead of paying attention to the needs and wants of the people of Arizona, is busy 
being the personal representative and spokesman of Harry Truman.”35 Throughout the 
spring, as Goldwater looked to diminish McFarland’s large lead, the Republican 
wedded the incumbent to the unpopular president, who he referred to as “the architect 
of socialism.”36 “We find McFarland trying to loosen from his neck the terrific weight 
of Truman,” Goldwater railed. In addition, Guy G. Gabrielson, chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, called McFarland “the Senate spokesman for the 
Truman New Deal-Fair Deal crowd,” sent to “defend their pitiful record.”37 The 
Tucson Daily Citizen endorsed Goldwater in October, writing that as Senate Majority 
Leader, McFarland “must be held accountable for the star-spangled shame,” which, in 
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their view, included high taxes, runaway spending, appeasement of Communism, and 
rising national debt.38 
These issues were constantly on Goldwater’s mind throughout the campaign. 
Writing to Senator Dirksen on June 2, Goldwater pushed for solid conservative 
talking points on the questions of the “financial mess” of the federal budget that many 
voters had asked him about on the campaign trail. “This being a strong Democratic 
state,” Goldwater wrote, “we have got to give reasonable, intelligent answers to those 
questions and I want to be sure to include the experience and the thinking that you 
have on the subject.”39 Although he had little formal education, Goldwater was 
quickly becoming a political intellectual, forcing his fellow Republicans to create a 
rational and reasoned foundation for the popular oratory on spending, Communism 
and the Korean War. 
While he had been introducing himself to Arizona for months, Goldwater 
formally kicked off his campaign on September 18 on the steps of the Yavapai 
County Courthouse, the seat of power occupied for so many years by his mentor, 
Uncle Morris. The speech surprised the audience of seven hundred. Goldwater 
refused to be “caricatured as a neanderthal Republican,” instead acknowledging the 
gains made through the Social Security system, unemployment insurance and old-age 
assistance, fragments of the New Deal he otherwise opposed with religious fervor.40 
Goldwater did not fully accept the legislation though, and continued to charge that 
“the New Dealers don’t begin to comprehend what made this country great,” arguing 	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that “the enterprise system” was truly behind America’s well-being, not government 
programs.41 In addition, the audience came away awed by Goldwater’s impressive 
oratory, especially as he came to the closing salvo of his speech. Days earlier, Senator 
McFarland had referred to the Korean War as a “cheap war,” as Chinese casualties 
outnumbered American casualties 9-to-1. “I’d challenge the junior senator from 
Arizona,” Goldwater argued, “to find anywhere within the border of this state…a 
single mother or father who counts our casualties as cheap—who’d be willing to 
exchange the life of one American boy for the nine Communists or the nine hundred 
Red Communists or nine million Communists.”42 
Aided by a friendly state press corps, the September 18 speech marked the 
turning point in the campaign. Confident in victory, and indifferent to the important 
lessons of the Frohmiller campaign two years earlier, McFarland hardly took his 
challenger seriously.43 When the Arizona Republic published a September poll 
showing the gap had narrowed, with McFarland at 49 percent and Goldwater at 46 
percent, it was already too late.44 By the end of October, the poll had flipped: 
Goldwater stood at 49 percent and McFarland at 46 percent.45 While Eisenhower 
carried Arizona over Adlai Stevenson by a wide margin of 55%-45% on Election 
Day, either due to his own strong candidacy or the unpopularity of Truman, 
Goldwater’s slim victory of 6,725 votes of nearly 260,000 cast was still remarkable 
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considering the political prowess of McFarland, and his relative popularity only 
months earlier. 
Clearly, Goldwater had ridden Eisenhower’s coattails to Washington, but he 
had also developed an impressive organization, which deserved tremendous credit for 
his victory. Over the course of only three years, Goldwater had provided the Arizona 
Republican Party with a well-articulated philosophy, a national network of donors, a 
registry of activists and the discipline and energy to win.46 Moreover, he achieved this 
while vocalizing a deeply conservative ideology, albeit with some moderate touches, 
in an overwhelmingly Democratic state. He became the first Republican to represent 
Arizona in the United States Senate in twenty-six years, and in the process had won 
the endorsement of 50,000 Democrats.47 
* * * 
Goldwater had already accrued national fame when he was sworn in to the United 
States Senate on January 3, 1953, the day after he turned forty-four. But while 
defeating the Majority Leader brought him celebrity status amongst insiders, he was 
still a rookie legislator, contributing little to the emerging Eisenhower agenda.48 
Moreover, Arizona constituents relied more heavily on his more senior colleague, 
Carl Hayden, who sat atop his perch on the powerful Appropriations Committee.49 
But Goldwater was still extremely valuable to his caucus. A young, energetic 
freshman, Goldwater knew how to win, and how to win in states that Republicans 
were not ordinarily competitive in. Attempting to capitalize on that talent, his eager 	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colleagues appointed him chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee 
(NRSC) in 1955.50 The move showed a recognition of Goldwater’s ability, his 
popularity with the rank-and-file across the country, and the growing appeal of 
conservatism. The most senior conservatives in the Senate, Dirksen and Minority 
Leader William Knowland of California, were running for reelection in 1956 and 
were eager for their young colleague’s assistance.51 Goldwater was a natural. He 
enjoyed traveling to every corner of the country, as well as the interaction with 
millions of Republican voters. During his first term as chairman, he logged more 
miles than any of the post’s predecessors, a testament to his work ethic and 
determination.52 
Republican audiences loved him just as much as he enjoyed meeting them. 
During one stop in California in 1959, Hannah Milhous Nixon, the mother of the vice 
president, was in the audience. In a letter to Goldwater on November 19, Richard 
Nixon wrote that his mother had described the Arizonan as “excellent” and “sincere,” 
making the luncheon “one of the best I have ever attended.” “My mother, 
incidentally, is quite a judge of character and does not go in for flamboyant 
exaggeration,” Nixon continued, “You must indeed have made a lasting and favorable 
impression upon her.”53 Goldwater was an effective cheerleader and spokesman, and 
a committed loyalist to his colleagues who yearned for his aid, regardless of their 
conservative credentials. During the 1956 midterm election, despite the expectation 
that the president’s party would lose seats, the Republicans clung to every single 	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one.54 Although they could not win the majority, the feat was still impressive, and no 
doubt partially due to Goldwater’s efforts. Howard Pyle, who had lost his 1954 
reelection bid to Ernest McFarland and now served as an assistant to Eisenhower, had 
originally urged Goldwater to reject the NRSC chairmanship. “I take it all back,” Pyle 
wrote his one-time campaign manager, “To be sure there have been disadvantages 
from your standpoint personally, but I am convinced that the advantages to all 
concerned far outweigh the disadvantages.”55 
By 1958, Goldwater was conducting his own reelection effort, and Ernest 
McFarland, elected governor in 1954, was eager for a rematch. But while many had 
believed 1952 was merely a fluke, Goldwater and his erstwhile campaign sage 
Stephen Shadegg were confident of victory this time as well. McFarland’s most noted 
biographer called it a contest of “style versus substance,” pitting the “flamboyant 
incumbent and the experienced challenger” in a race destined to become “one of the 
most controversial in senate history.”56 While Goldwater had become a national 
conservative icon, early observers of the race viewed it as a tough battle for him. 
During his six years in Washington, Goldwater had done little to distinguish himself 
and McFarland, already well-known for his decade in the Senate, had already 
defeated the Goldwater operation created for Governor Howard Pyle only two years 
earlier when he seized the governorship. 
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Carl Hayden, Arizona’s most revered leader, divided legislators between show 
horses and workhorses.57 Despite all his work on behalf of his party, Goldwater was 
viewed by many as a mere show horse, unable to keep pace with the diligent work, 
and lacking the intellectual capacity, expected of senators. For his part, McFarland 
was itching to capitalize on the caricature, juxtaposing his own intellectualism with 
Goldwater’s meager education. It quickly gained traction and in the midst of the 
campaign Shadegg wrote Goldwater regarding an awkward ordeal his children had 
witnessed during classes at Camelback High School. Two of the school’s teachers, 
Mr. Powell and Mr. Mote, were “constantly making derogatory remarks about you 
and about your service in the Senate.” The class discussion quickly turned to the 1958 
campaign, leading Powell to conclude “he would prefer to have a P.H.D. representing 
him in the Senate than a man who had to spend an extra year to get through grammar 
school and an extra year to get through high school.”58 While Goldwater had always 
been defensive, and embarrassed, of his educational performance, he let the ordeal 
slide. 
McFarland maintained the representation of his opponent as an incapable 
class-clown as a constant portrayal. He referred to Goldwater as “a desperate man” 
and “reactionary opponent” who resorted to “every conceivable means of building up 
prejudices” instead of tackling “the real issues that are important to the people of 
Arizona.”59 Goldwater’s poor academic performance became an important theme in 
characterizing his weak legislative agenda, leading Goldwater to rely on his holdover 
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operation from six years earlier, which emphasized the Shadegg expertise and the 
Pulliam press. 
The “real issues” of the campaign, to Goldwater, had always been the power 
of labor unions, an issue he had dealt with throughout his first term. A wave of 
discontent against elements of the New Deal was emerging and Goldwater quickly 
became an active participant.60 At the start of his Senate career, Goldwater begged the 
Republican leader, Robert Taft, to place him on the Armed Services Committee. Taft 
refused, instead assigning him to the Labor Committee. Goldwater protested that he 
was a businessman who had little experience with unions, but that was precisely the 
reason Taft wanted him.61 Although dissatisfied, Goldwater saw opportunity in his 
new assignment.  
The Labor Committee did not deal solely with labor issues, but also with 
education, the minimum wage and social welfare issues.62 His diligence led to his 
appointment in 1957 to the famed McClellan Rackets Committee (where he served 
with John F. Kennedy), which was responsible for the investigation of union leaders 
Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa. The work became a cornerstone issue of Goldwater’s 
1958 campaign. Six years earlier, McFarland had depended heavily on union support 
for his election and he was determined to resurrect that network during his rematch. 
By 1957, union membership had reached 17.5 million nationwide, representing over a 
quarter of the civilian work force.63 While union membership was less substantial in 
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the Southwest, it had still been steadily rising, and the number of Arizona unionists 
had increased from 16,600 in 1939 to 57,400 in 1953.64 To Goldwater, the shift 
represented a threat to the principles he championed, such as free enterprise, 
entrepreneurism and individual choice.  
Throughout the campaign, Goldwater blasted his opponent for his allegiance 
to “labor bosses.” The Prescott Courier noted, “Goldwater hasn’t courted the 
approval of labor chiefs; rather he has paid more heed to the union membership rank 
and file than to them.”65 The sharp contrast allowed Goldwater to continue to bill 
himself as “a man of independence and integrity.”66 The labor narrative was a strong 
one, mostly because of the ease in connecting McFarland to the issue. During his 
1954 gubernatorial campaign, McFarland had collected $4,000 from the Western 
Teamsters and he was strongly endorsed in 1958 by the AFL-CIO Committee on 
Political Education (COPE).67 The subject became so contentious that it drew national 
attention, with the Saturday Evening Post endorsing Goldwater as “the most 
aggressive, articulate, colorful, and possibly the most conservative conservative in the 
U.S. Senate.”68 Goldwater seemed to be crafting the narrative of the entire campaign, 
centralizing it on the single issue of labor, one which he had become intimately 
familiar with over his legislative tenure. By October the labor issue was gaining 
traction and Jim Cooper listed “labor influence” as one of the deciding factors in the 
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Goldwater-McFarland race.69 In some ways, it must have seemed as if Goldwater was 
not running against McFarland at all, but Beck, Hoffa and, above all, Walter Reuther 
of the United Auto Workers. 
More importantly, Goldwater understood how to link the labor narrative to 
both the concerns of his Arizona constituents and his conservative dialogue. 
Moderately conversant with labor issues as a local businessman, he had aggressively 
fought against the Wagner Act, which he referred to as “sweetheart legislation” for 
forcing companies to hire union members and negotiate solely with union 
leadership.70 Through those debates Goldwater became closely acquainted with 
Denison Kitchel, a Harvard-educated easterner who had moved to Arizona and served 
as the labor counsel to the mining company Phelps Dodge. It was Kitchel who would 
help Goldwater frame the union issue, and quickly become his best friend.71 Just as 
Goldwater had tied McFarland to Truman six years earlier, in 1958 the name 
McFarland became synonymous with labor, the “growing and evil concentration of 
power in the American business community.”72 “We must remember in the 
November 4 general election,” Goldwater told audiences in September, “that the 
Republican opposition will not come from the Democratic Party. It will come from 
COPE.”73 
Despite the impressive rhetoric though, the election was still in McFarland’s 
favor. He had universal name-recognition, a remarkable record, a serious campaign 
and his opponent’s ticket would not be headed by Dwight Eisenhower this time 	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around. But on October 31, four days before the election, McFarland’s supporters 
made a crucial mistake. Frank Goldberg, a former official of the International 
Association of Machinists, and Earl Anderson, former Arizona chairman of the 
Machinists Nonpartisan Political League, published a cartoon. Picturing a winking 
Joseph Stalin smoking a pipe, the ad read: “Why Not Vote for Goldwater”?74 The 
bizarre attempt to link Goldwater, the most outspoken Red-baiter since McCarthy, to 
Communism was an abysmal flop. Although McFarland had had no knowledge of the 
leaflet production (and had even called for a formal Senate investigation once he 
found out), the event permanently damaged his campaign.75 On November 3, while 
columnist H.V. Kaltenborn predicted that the Democrats were “slated to win an 
outstanding victory,” he also conceded that “labor scandals…have hurt labor unions 
with the general public,” as well as the Democratic candidates they endorsed.76  
Goldwater relied heavily on the press to disseminate his criticisms of labor 
interests. His most willing ally, Eugene Pulliam had eagerly bashed McFarland 
whenever an opportunity arose. “If Goldwater recited ‘Mary Had a Little Lamb,’” one 
critic joked, “The Pulliam press would make it the banner story of the day.”77 
Pulliam’s Arizona Republic wrote that Goldwater was “frank enough to say that the 
nation had too many rubberstamp senators in the last two decades,” a not-so-subtle 
jab at McFarland’s tenure. The Phoenix Gazette lauded Goldwater for “voting as his 
conscience dictated and as he thought his constituents wanted him to,” adding, 
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“That’s all the great state of Arizona can expect of any elected official.”78 Towards 
the close of the campaign, Pulliam reported that COPE was spending $450,000 on 
state races, attempting to buy the election from honest citizens. The Chicago Tribune 
alleged that $500,000 was being “wielded by labor’s political education committee to 
beat Senator Goldwater.”79 In reality, the actual amount was $14,000.80 More 
independent newspapers had also joined the Goldwater team though. The Mesa Daily 
Tribune called Goldwater “a true champion” for his support of better military pay and 
the Arizona Range News urged readers to force their other representatives to “be as 
brave as Senator Goldwater.”81 “It is a small wonder that in every corner of the 
country they hold you in high esteem,” Dirksen wrote to Goldwater, “It is simply a 
tribute to your courage, your singleness of purpose and your determination to get a 
job done.”82 
On November 4, 1958, Republicans went down in defeat across the country. 
Twenty-five of the thirty-two Senate candidates endorsed by COPE had won. 
Conservative candidates from California to Ohio were defeated, including Republican 
leader William Knowland. The anti-union message seemed to have failed 
universally—except in Arizona.83 Goldwater won a double-digit victory over 
McFarland, capturing 56 percent to his opponent’s 43 percent. The remarkable win in 
a year when Democrats picked up fifteen Senate seats was because of Goldwater’s 
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political acumen. A believer in the simplicity of a campaign message, Goldwater had 
faithfully maintained control of his, constantly hammering away at labor leaders in a 
way in which Arizonans could identify. Moreover, he was an avid fundraiser. With 
Rosenzweig once again in charge, Goldwater raised five times as much as he had in 
1952 and outraised McFarland by over $75,000.84 In addition, he had padded his 
coffers with thousands of dollars from wealthy out-of-state contributors, just as he 
had done in his previous campaign. His greatest advantage, though, had always been 
his close alliance with the Arizona press.  
 Sworn into his second term in January 1959, Goldwater began to emerge as a 
significant figure on the national political stage. The next four years would be crucial 
as he attempted to balance his personal ambition to be a dutiful senator with the 
hopeful wishes of activists who urged him to be a candidate for president in 1960. So 
magnetic was his appeal that delegates from South Carolina and Arizona began 
actively pushing him to announce his intention to challenge Richard Nixon for the 
nomination. Buoyed by his conservative credentials, and his new best-selling book 
Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater cautiously permitted the planning for a 
conservative insurgency.  
* * * 
On March 26, 1960, a full five months before the national convention, South Carolina 
declared their thirteen votes for Goldwater, during a time when open presidential 
primaries were still an oddity. Refusing to be outdone in praise for their favorite son, 
the Arizona delegation quickly asked Goldwater what to do. In a letter to a young 
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William Rehnquist, then an Arizona Republican leader, Goldwater wrote simply that 
Nixon was “our man.”85 Still, after Nixon secretly conceded points in the party 
platform to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Goldwater criticized the vice president as 
an apathetic conservative who strayed too far from party principles with his support 
of New Deal and Fair Deal policies.86 And Goldwater was not the only insurgent 
Nixon had to defend himself from. Despite Nixon’s Madison Avenue concessions, 
Rockefeller remained uncommitted to ending his own bid for the presidency. Only in 
his first term as the chief executive of New York, Rockefeller began earnestly 
courting delegates after he was inaugurated in January 1959. In a letter to Goldwater 
on May 31, 1960, Rockefeller praised Goldwater’s independence and candor, writing, 
“I wish that everybody in public life expressed his view as forthrightly as you do.”87 
Hardly sincere, these were no doubt words Rockefeller would come to regret.  
A month before the convention opened, the infant Goldwater operation was 
assured of one hundred delegate votes on the first ballot. The real fight, though, was 
the vice presidential nomination, where Goldwater was the first choice of nearly three 
hundred delegates.88 During the same time period, Robert Croll, a graduate student at 
Northwestern University, founded Youth for Goldwater for Vice President. In the 
organization’s maiden press release, Croll announced that chapters had already been 
founded across the country, at Stanford, Yale, Harvard, Wellesley and the University 
of Virginia.89 By the time of the convention, Youth for Goldwater for Vice President 
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boasted sixty-five campus chapters in thirty-two states. “All of the young Goldwater 
supporters have one thing in common,” Croll said, “We are conservatives.”90 
While Goldwater won the nomination neither for president nor vice president, 
his convention showing furthered his reputation as a Republican heavyweight. In only 
eight years he had moved from the Phoenix city council to the national stage, creating 
an army of devoted followers along the way. The defeat of Richard Nixon in 
November 1960 further convinced Goldwater that the party needed serious help. 
Viewing the election loss as a replay of Republican defeats in 1944 and 1948, 
Goldwater reasoned that Nixon had been too indistinguishable from Kennedy. The 
“me-tooism” that Republicans of the Eastern Establishment employed simply offered 
voters insufficient alternatives, and Goldwater believed Nixon himself had failed to 
give the electorate “a clear-cut choice.”91 As Goldwater headed back to Washington 
for the beginning of the New Frontier in 1961, he did so with a strong concern for the 
future of conservatism, as well as that of the country. 
In January 1961, the Republican caucus went about choosing its leadership. 
Among the easier decisions was chairman of the National Republican Senate 
Committee. During Goldwater’s previous tenure he had steadfastly defended every 
incumbent, and his political influence across the country had only grown since. While 
Senator Jacob Javits, a liberal Republican from New York, fumed at Goldwater’s 
reelection to the post, other ideological foes were more aware of Goldwater’s 
remarkable strength. Margaret Chase Smith, a Maine moderate, gave Goldwater “an 
unsolicited endorsement,” saying that the two had come to a “considerable 	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convergence” of views and that the Arizonan “had made an ‘excellent chairman.’” 
Noting that Goldwater had greatly aided her own reelection in 1960, Smith continued 
that her colleague was “imaginative, energetic, forceful and effective,” working 
tirelessly for every candidate “regardless of differing political philosophies.”92 The 
great Goldwater machine had clearly emerged as an unmatched organization, and the 
chairman would go to any length to aid his peers. In 1962, for example, when the 
NRSC was hampered by a series of bookkeeping errors only days before the election, 
Goldwater advanced its operating funds out of his own pocket without hesitation.93 
Goldwater maintained a packed agenda in 1961, scheduling 225 speaking 
engagements and receiving over eight hundred pieces of mail every day.94 
Consistently compared to the new president for his energy, enthusiasm and good 
looks, Business Week gushed that the conservative was “as handsome as a movie star” 
and Time added he was “the hottest political figure this side of Jack Kennedy.”95 The 
New York Times wrote that after President Kennedy, “Senator Goldwater is the most 
exciting and provocative figure on the political landscape today.”96 Many already 
considered Goldwater a presidential aspirant—including Kennedy himself. During a 
meeting in the Oval Office, the president turned to his old Senate friend and said, “So 
you really want this fucking job, huh?”97 Whether or not Goldwater truly wanted to 
be president is unknown. He was a popular, national figure who had devoted his life 
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to an ideology based on the liberty of the individual, but he had hardly sought the 
level of stardom that enveloped him.  
There is considerable evidence that Goldwater truly did not want to be 
president. In 1962, he confided in his journal: “Maybe it’s old age but for the first 
time in a rather long career of ‘hilling the husting’ I feel tired.”98 He added in a 
separate entry, “I must make a reluctant admission, namely that I can no longer make 
three to eight speeches and meetings a day. It isn’t so much the physical fatigue as it 
is a mental one and this is not occasioned so much by the demands of the presentation 
as by the demands of the people.”99 Exhausted from his double-life as both a 
campaigner and legislator, Goldwater was not ready to commit to a campaign for the 
presidency. But regardless of his personal ambitions, the organization he was 
consistently developing seemed to suggest that he was still entertaining the possibility 
of a national campaign. 
That same year, Goldwater headed to the far reaches of Alaska to aid the 
Republican efforts there. He toured oil fields and learned about the concerns of the 
small communities that dotted the vast state, including the wage rate and cost of 
living. “It is a state that in many ways reminds me of Arizona in my youth,” 
Goldwater wrote, “Wide open—a variety of geography and challenges on every 
turn.”100 Ted Stevens, who lost that year but would be elected to the U.S. Senate in 
1968, never forgot Goldwater’s kindness in assisting with that first campaign. At the 
conclusion of one of his speaking engagements, Stevens presented Goldwater with 
the traditional gift given to male visitors: a petrified walrus penis. As Goldwater held 	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the oosik, he remarked, “I don’t know why, but this makes me think of Lyndon 
Johnson.”101 The charm, wit and personality of the Westerner earned him many 
admirers, and his loyalty to the shared cause of his colleagues allowed him to curry 
dozens of political favors. 
The true prowess of the Goldwater equation was felt in Texas during the 1961 
special election to fill the vacant Senate seat of Vice President Johnson. A Republican 
had not been elected in the Lone Star state since Morgan C. Hamilton won reelection 
in 1871. The GOP’s rising star was determined to change that ninety-year trajectory. 
John Tower, a college professor who had garnered 41 percent against Lyndon 
Johnson in his 1960 campaign for the U.S. Senate, was the only Republican of the 
seventy-one candidates who had filed to run. The New York Times reported that 
Goldwater was acclaimed as “Texas’ favorite son” as he campaigned across the state 
for Tower in March. Four thousand spectators appeared for his speech in San 
Antonio, and “Senator Goldwater did not disappoint.”102 Tower, a self-professed 
“Goldwater Republican,” won with 50.6 percent in a tight race, demonstrating the 
strong rise of national conservatism.103  
The newly minted leader of this political shift was indisputably Barry 
Goldwater, who had done more for the Republican Party than any figure in the 
preceding decade. In only ten years, the Phoenix businessman turned reformer had 
demonstrated exceptional skills, including oratorical power, political messaging, 
structural organizing and fundraising. He was able to simplify lofty goals and 	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translate political themes into a vernacular. Most importantly, he proved that 
ideological purists could win in the strongest Democratic strongholds. The Goldwater 
strategy demonstrated a unique set of variables that could be employed in the West, 
South and Northeast to ensure Republican victories. It was no wonder that many 
Republicans, tired of the Eastern Establishment’s dominance over the party, yearned 
for his entry in the 1964 contest. And if he would not willingly enter the race, Indiana 
State Treasurer Bob Hughes noted that there was only one thing the rank-and-file 
could do: “Let’s draft the s.o.b.”104  
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III. MISCALCULATIONS, MISSTEPS & VICTORY 
 
 
 Barry Goldwater arrived in his hometown to announce his candidacy for 
president on the same Yavapai County Courthouse steps where he had kicked off his 
1952 campaign for the U.S. Senate. Goldwater hobbled to the podium on crutches, 
still recovering from surgery he had had weeks earlier, richly symbolic of the 
campaign to come. It was January 3, 1964, with a little more than two months before 
the first primary, and years after Goldwater had first considered a national campaign. 
His hometown paper, the Arizona Republic, an important ally through each of his 
campaigns, hailed its favorite son. Under the headline “Senator Looks Able and 
Ready,” the paper reported, “The press agreed that Barry was never sharper than for 
his big moment.”1 The UPI wire wrote that national GOP leaders “across the entire 
party spectrum…cheered Sen. Barry Goldwater’s entry into the ranks of presidential 
candidates,” calling the primary campaign “evidence of GOP vitality.”2 But behind 
all the confidence and celebration stood a man deeply torn over his decision. 
 For years, Goldwater had agonized over whether he even wanted to be 
president, whether he should run for president, and whether he would be a good 
president. By January 1964 when he announced his candidacy, the excitement that 
had led him to consider it in the first place had all but faded. Shorty after Nixon’s 
defeat in November 1960, a campaign that Goldwater had worked tirelessly for, the 
Arizonan’s inner circle began actively weighing the 1964 race. But as early as 1961, 	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Goldwater was publically shrugging off a campaign, offering a Sherman-esque 
declaration to Time, “I have no staff for it, no program for it, and no ambition for it.”3 
Even while the senator outwardly dismissed a national campaign, he was also quietly 
organizing an advisory committee of close friends, leaving the possibility open. And 
he was not the only candidate preparing. With Nelson Rockefeller already actively 
courting national party leaders, Goldwater asked his advisers to draft a campaign plan 
in December 1962, a full year before his formal announcement. “The Program,” as it 
was dubbed, outlined fundraising and public relations staffs, as well as the advantages 
of a campaign. The chief reason for a Goldwater candidacy, it argued, was for the 
preservation of the Republican Party through conservative values. “Failure to act now 
ensured the success of Nelson Rockefeller…If conservatives surrendered without a 
fight, ‘modern Republicanism’ would vault to control of the party, and the right 
‘might not recover for a generation.’”4 More than anything, the fear of a continuation 
of what he perceived as status quo, “me-tooism” Republicanism was what convinced 
Goldwater to run. 
 In addition, a growing contingent of grassroots activists, separate from 
Goldwater’s internal operations, was busy building a respectable organization for the 
senator.5 Shadegg noted after the election, “In a very real sense, Senator Barry 
Goldwater was nominated for President by the men who met in Chicago thirty-three 
months in advance of the Republican convention.”6 As late as January 1963 though, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Salesman for a Cause,” Time, June 23, 1961, 16. 
4 Robert Alan Goldberg, Barry Goldwater (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 169. 
5 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 110.	  
6 Stephen Shadegg, What Happened to Goldwater? (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 
44. 
In Reckless Pursuit | 45	  	  
 	  
Goldwater had told the mastermind behind the draft operation, F. Clifton White, that 
he would not be a candidate. Furthermore, Goldwater was insulted by the idea that 
supporters would “paint him into a corner,” chastising White that it was his “political 
neck on the line and I intend to have something to say about what happens to it.”7 But 
White continued, with or without his candidate’s blessing, to try to elect him 
president of the United States.  That Chicago meeting, organized by White in 1961 to 
build a coalition of die-hard conservative intellectuals for Goldwater, quickly erupted 
into a powerful movement. Along with his friends from the Young Republicans, such 
as Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio and William Rusher, publisher of the infant 
National Review, White hoped to provide legitimacy to a Goldwater candidacy. 
While Rusher felt that the country, still jubilant over the emerging New Frontier, was 
not ready for an abrupt ideological shift, he also felt that the senator’s personality and 
political reputation could overcome that handicap.8 Further, with young conservatives 
outraged by Eisenhower’s moderation and Kennedy’s liberalism, Goldwaterism was 
perfectly timed to capture the energetic support of these organizers.  
The inaugural Chicago session brought twenty-two representatives from 
sixteen states, representing the Midwest, south and northeast.9 Among the attendees 
were state party chairmen, wealthy financiers and a lobbyist for Standard Oil (ironic, 
considering Goldwater’s chief opponent was a Rockefeller). Perhaps most interesting 
was that the group was packed with Harvard graduates and well-pedigreed lawyers, a 
fact that would quickly force Goldwater to distrust them. The mission, the group 	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decided in 1961, was to work to combat the “Orwellian prophecy of the Big Brother 
state,” not necessarily supporting a specific candidate, although many had argued for 
tying the effort to Goldwater from the outset.10 Regardless of their stated intentions, 
Goldwater for President was always on the minds of these organizers, and White was 
dispatched to inform the senator of the meeting shortly after they adjourned. 
 While he pleaded with White to cease a draft, Goldwater was still considering 
a campaign, and clearly seemed to be preparing for a run. In June 1961 alone he made 
twenty-three speeches across the country without ever once missing a significant 
Senate roll call vote.11 Because he had never given the group a firm and specific “no” 
about his presidential intentions, the members of the Chicago meeting continued to 
lay the groundwork for a full-fledged movement. When the group reconvened in 
December 1962, this time with twice as many attendees, the mission was clear: Barry 
Goldwater would be their candidate in 1964.12 Working at the grassroots level, Suite 
3505, as the organization became known, was devoted to raising funds for the 
primary campaign as well as convincing state delegations to support Goldwater, 
beginning with those who had in 1960. “The organization of local draft-Goldwater 
clubs… is now well under way,” wrote William Rusher, “and is plainly going to 
result in catalyzing a nationwide grass-roots movement of unmistakable size and 
seriousness.”13 After he won the nomination, the New York Times noted that 
Goldwater could not have achieved the feat without the seemingly spontaneous 
movement that had sprung up due to White’s efforts. “This amorphous 	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movement…provided the hard core base of Mr. Goldwater’s support in every state.”14 
And while the Times noted that those efforts had started as early as 1963, it was 
clearly much earlier. 
 Still, Goldwater had doubts. Dean Burch, an assistant and close associate of 
Goldwater’s, wrote to the senator in January 1963 to outline the disadvantages of 
running for president. Topping the list was the “improbability” of defeating Kennedy 
in 1964. Additionally, if Goldwater were to run he could not run for the Senate, and 
would lose a job he dearly cherished. If Goldwater did run and was defeated, he 
would be left without a platform to continue to espouse conservatism until at least 
1968.15 And finally, there were dozens of “practical problems…inherent in a national 
campaign” that would be both difficult and bothersome to overcome, such as 
developing a functioning national organization. Burch concluded that the real contest 
would be in 1968. “After Kennedy and his brand of back-biting, personal politics, the 
country will be desperate for maturity,” he wrote.16 Almost breathing a sigh of relief, 
Goldwater thanked Burch for his well-reasoned response, once again stressing that he 
did not want the nomination:  
I think that my request to hold off any pressure for at least a year will slow 
down the almost hourly pressure to seek the nomination which I assure you I 
do not want. By that time, I feel either Rockefeller will have developed an 
overwhelming lead or somebody promoted by the kingmakers will have been 
offered as a sacrificial lamb, and I can go my way happily seeking a third term 
in the Senate.17 
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But Goldwater had not entirely dismissed the idea. In an intricate mind game 
that seemed to fluctuate with his emotions, Goldwater still desperately wanted to aid a 
country he felt was on the wrong track. While he considered John F. Kennedy a good 
friend and inspirational colleague, Goldwater felt the young president was ill-
prepared to handle the mounting tasks facing him. As early as 1961, only months 
after Kennedy had been inaugurated, Goldwater commented in his journal on “JFK’s 
very apparent inability to lead.” Goldwater, along with much of the country he 
believed, was growing increasingly concerned over the president’s interactions with 
the Soviet Union, especially as Cuba became involved. In May 1963, Goldwater had 
written to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, arguing that the administration’s 
policy “is to permit the Soviet such wide latitude in expanding its entire weapons 
complex…that it may, in fact, achieve first a balance of power and then a lead.” In 
response, McNamara wrote, “I know of no responsible person in public life, military 
or civilian, who would agree with you.”18 Goldwater was hardly deterred. Further, 
Goldwater’s criticism was not limited to nuclear threat, but on the general conduct of 
the Kennedy administration. He wrote, “The concern in the country is over the 
proposals of the New Frontier, the fuzzy headed group who surround the President 
and the President’s lack of leadership.”19  
While Goldwater fundamentally disagreed with Kennedy’s policies, he had a 
great respect for him. It was the thrill of a head-to-head contest with his former 
Senate colleague that assured Goldwater that a campaign would be worthwhile. With 
Goldwater appearing to be a strong frontrunner for his party’s nomination in 1964, he 	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and the president often discussed what the election would look like if they were to 
campaign against one another. Above all, both men envisioned a high-stakes 
philosophical debate. They would travel together on the same plane, argue 
ferociously at different stops across the country, and then return to the same plane.20 
After months of internal debating, Goldwater had been set to announce his candidacy 
in early December 1963. In one of the great what-ifs of political history, the 
Kennedy-Goldwater election may have provided unmatched maturity to an otherwise 
bitter era. Years later, Goldwater wrote to a New York supporter that a campaign 
against Kennedy would “have been an illuminating experience for the American 
people because we would have argued the issues.”  When he learned of the 
president’s assassination on November 22, his own aspirations seemed to have faded. 
“I told my wife I would not consider running for the Presidency,” he wrote to the 
same supporter. “Of course, I later changed my mind but it never was the campaign 
that it would have been with Jack on the other side.”21 
While he may have considered dropping the campaign for a short period of 
time, Goldwater still actively began preparing. On November 30, less than a week 
after Kennedy’s state funeral, Goldwater was soliciting the advice of Dwight 
Eisenhower on talking points regarding the Tennessee Valley Authority, an object of 
conservative ire since the 1930s.22 And observers were not taking a break from the 
forthcoming campaign either. On November 25, the day of the president’s funeral, 
Louis Harris’s survey released an updated poll for the New Hampshire primary, over 
four months away. In a head-to-head match up against the only declared candidate, 	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Nelson Rockefeller, Goldwater took 52 percent to the New York governor’s 33 
percent. Noting that this was the “first authoritative poll of New Hampshire’s key 
presidential primary,” Harris nonetheless cautioned “Goldwater’s hold on GOP voters 
is not really solid and the Arizona senator appears strongest when pitted against 
Rockefeller.”23 An earlier November Associated Press poll though, surveying 
Republican state and county leaders nationwide, declared Goldwater “the runaway 
choice of Republican Presidential preferences.” 85 percent of the 1,404 party faithful 
surveyed chose the Arizonan as the party’s strongest candidate. In New Hampshire, 
32 of the 39 county committeemen responded to the survey, and 22 declared their 
allegiance to an unannounced Goldwater.24 Even as his dreams for the perfect 
campaign were slain along with John F. Kennedy, Goldwater had many promising 
reasons to enter the race. “Barry, I don’t think you can back down,” said Denison 
Kitchel, Goldwater’s closest confidant.25 Although perhaps against his better 
judgment, Goldwater rode on to the national stage. 
Only days before his official announcement in January 1964, David Lawrence 
wrote in his national column that Goldwater’s popularity was due to his “evident 
conviction” and his staunch sense of morality. “The Arizona senator’s popularity is 
related to the spontaneous response of many Republican voters who feel he reflects 
their militancy,” he wrote.26 Although his convictions and deep-rooted morals may 
have been exemplary, those men he chose to make up his close-knit personal staff 
were not. Goldwater’s construction of his campaign team was odd in both who he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Louis Harris, “Sen. Goldwater Holds Lead in New Hampshire,” Oelwein Daily Register (IA), 
November 25, 1963, 6. 
24 “Goldwater Wins Wide Lead In Poll,” New York Times, November 3, 1963, 1. 
25 Edwards, 199. 
26 David Lawrence, “Barry’s Popularity,” Steubenville Herald (OH), January 1, 1964, 6. 
In Reckless Pursuit | 51	  	  
 	  
included, and who he did not. Among the most questionable appointments was that of 
campaign manager, which would have widespread ramifications in the coming 
campaign. Since 1952, Goldwater had had only one manager, the well-known and 
well-respected Arizona heavyweight Stephen Shadegg. It was Shadegg who had 
helped jumpstart Goldwater’s infant candidacy for the United States Senate, had 
worked to articulate the conservative philosophy and had carefully orchestrated 
Goldwater’s rise to national prominence. It would have been obvious for Goldwater 
to appoint his long-time deputy to lead his presidential run. Despite that decade-long 
friendship though, Goldwater cast Shadegg aside, one of his most substantial strategic 
errors.  
Historians have written that Goldwater cast off his friend for his presidential 
run due to Shadegg’s personal quest for Arizona’s other Senate seat. According to 
biographer Robert A. Goldberg, Goldwater “hit the ceiling” when he heard that 
Shadegg planned to challenge Senator Carl Hayden, one of the body’s most senior 
members, in 1962. He “personalized the dispute,” feeling both “exposed and used” by 
Shadegg.27  Lee Edwards added that Shadegg remained “outside the pale as a result of 
his failed 1962 attempt” to dethrone Hayden.28 The cause for the rift in the 
relationship was not so simple though. Deeply appreciative of genuine friendships, 
Goldwater valued loyalty as a key character trait. Although he was probably not 
disappointed in Shadegg for choosing to run (Goldwater had often repeated that the 
decision to run is one’s “own decision to make for himself”), he was surely distraught 
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that he had found out about Shadegg’s intentions through a press release.29 In 
addition, Goldwater was probably most concerned with his own image. The sight of 
his closest friend as a candidate made it appear that Arizona’s highest ranking 
Republican was acting as a puppeteer. Only days after Shadegg’s announcement, the 
Arizona Journal wrote that while Goldwater would declare neutrality in the 
Republican primary, he would “have a hard time disassociating himself from the 
contest. And it will be even more difficult for him to emerge from the election 
without losing some support.” Moreover, the column argued, a Shadegg victory “will 
be attributed to Goldwater’s influence.”30 
As expected, Goldwater did all he could to disassociate himself from the 
Senate race. In a blunt telegram to reporters sniffing for hints of favoritism, 
Goldwater wrote, “My position relative to primary is absolutely neutral, as it should 
and must be.”31 Goldwater was not completely sitting on the sidelines though. 
Throughout the primary race, which Shadegg would ultimately lose, Goldwater made 
small steps to aid Shadegg. When Goldwater made Senator Hayden’s voting record 
available to a mutual friend, he suggested Shadegg reach out to her, “If you wanted to 
copy them for use in your campaign.”32 That type of aid continued throughout 
Shadegg’s campaign, with Goldwater supplying information concerning Hayden’s 
votes well into August.33 Further, stories that there had been a rift disturbed both men. 
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“They are saying that you and I had a hell of a fight and that in a fit of anger I made 
my announcement,” Shadegg confided to Goldwater. “I’m positive the people who 
know me and know you,” he continued, “will realize I am completely dedicated to 
your cause and to your future and would never do anything of a political nature 
against your wishes.”34 For all those rumors though, and biographers’ speculations, 
Goldwater maintained a close relationship with Shadegg.  
By December 1962, only months after the Senate primary election, Goldwater 
asked Shadegg to manage his 1964 campaign, which they both clearly understood 
could be for either the U.S. Senate or the presidency. On February 9, 1963 though, 
Goldwater abruptly changed his mind. Whether it was truly due to the 1962 Senate 
campaign, as biographers argue, or to Shadegg’s involvement with the Salt River 
Project in the 1950s, the official reason Goldwater gave, is unknown. Regardless, the 
decision took Shadegg by surprise, and he told Goldwater that he “was totally 
unprepared” for it. Clearly disappointed, and believing it had more to do with 1962 
than Goldwater revealed, Shadegg wrote to his old friend, “I want it to be clear 
between us that despite the events of 1962, I was still eager to devote what talent I 
have in this business to your cause in 1964.”35 Shadegg, the mastermind who had 
devoted so much to Goldwater’s popular rise, would be relegated to the sidelines 
during the presidential race, depriving the campaign of the single greatest expert on 
Goldwater conservatism.  
Originally, Goldwater hoped to replace Shadegg with “the only pro in the 
Republican Party,” Leonard Hall. Hall had served as chairman of the Republican 	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National Committee for most of Eisenhower’s administration and was a gifted party 
organizer. David W. Reinhard contends that Hall was Goldwater’s choice as 
campaign manager, but Hall refused.36 In the place of political professionals like Hall 
and Shadegg, Goldwater turned to a man “who had neither the skill nor the 
temperament to direct a national campaign.”37 Denison Kitchel, the least experienced 
presidential campaign manager in decades, was “selected because he was a warm 
friend of the senator.”38 Charles Mohr described him simply as “a newcomer,” but 
also a positive “contrast to the candidate’s Western exuberance.”39 Kitchel, a 
Harvard-trained lawyer who had become acquainted with Goldwater through their 
mutual interest in labor issues, had little political experience. In fact, the only political 
experience he could list was serving as the general counsel to the Arizona Republican 
Party. Goldwater hadn’t chosen him for his experience though. Goldwater himself 
wrote that Kitchel’s appointment was a “twist of fate,” referring to him as the 
senator’s “antithesis” for his lack of both political experience and connections.40 
Robert Novak commented towards the end of the campaign that one of Goldwater’s 
chief failings was his criterion for filling campaign jobs, “not so much on political 
astuteness as on unquestioned loyalty.”41 Kitchel himself noted the oddity in his 
selection, writing to the senator, “You have picked a real green horn, but if 
enthusiasm and determination can eventually produce a qualified campaign manager, 
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I expect to make the grade.”42 Neither enthusiasm nor determination ever truly made 
the grade though. 
In addition to Kitchel, Goldwater’s other chief selections were Dean Burch, as 
Kitchel’s deputy, and Richard Kleindheist as director of field operations. Tony Smith, 
the senator’s longtime press secretary, although in failing health, was tasked with 
managing the national press.43 None of these men had any particular experience 
outside of Arizona politics, but all were completely loyal to Goldwater. Although a 
Harvard graduate, Novak described Kleindheist as “the Western cowboy roughneck: 
tactless, boisterous, and professionally profane in two languages (English and 
Navajo).” Simply put, he was “not necessarily the most suitable personality for 
wooing political support.”44 Burch had begun working as a legislative aide for 
Goldwater in 1955, when he was just twenty-seven years old. He held his boss in 
such high esteem that when his child was born in January 1963, he asked Goldwater 
to serve as the godfather.45 The New York Times described Burch as a Goldwater 
“protégé” who, like Kitchel and Kleindheist, was “relatively unknown in national 
politics.”46  
 By May 1963, Kitchel and Burch were still under the impression that the 
campaign they had joined was for the United States Senate. Burch was eagerly 
making preparations to organize Goldwater’s Pima County headquarters for the race. 
Soliciting Kitchel’s advice, Burch asked, “What sort of thoughts do you have on the 
staffing and furnishing of such an office?,” a clear indication that their minds were 	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elsewhere.47 By August, only four months before Goldwater planned to announce his 
campaign for the presidency, Kitchel and Burch still lacked a clear understanding of 
Goldwater’s intentions and remained unprepared. With the Tucson campaign office 
opened, Burch was unsure what to do next. “We still don’t have a typewriter, nor do I 
have any real work for the girl to do,” he wrote to Kitchel, “Could you give me a ring 
at your earliest convenience so we can figure out a program?”48 For the next year and 
a half, the two would face the same dilemma: clearing lines of communication and 
figuring out the program. 
 It was not only who Goldwater included in his staff that handicapped his 
candidacy, but also who he excluded. Shadegg’s exclusion was the most damaging, 
but Goldwater also purged the greatest conservative intellectuals of the era, including 
William F. Buckley, Bill Rusher and Brent Bozell, all of whom had been enthusiastic 
Goldwater supporters. Most intellectuals and academics were “prevented from 
making any significant contribution to the 1964 campaign.”49 The protective advisers, 
and Goldwater himself, “drew the curtains so tightly that Buckley was relegated to 
advising Goldwater through the pages of National Review,” wrote Goldberg.50 Barry 
Goldwater, while at one point an admirer of the intellectual elite, had grown 
distrustful of them. Either because he lacked a formal education himself or because of 
his uncertainty in seeking the presidency, Goldwater felt most secure and comfortable 
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surrounding himself with fellow Arizonans. Calling themselves “a bunch of 
cowboys,” Perlstein notes that they were “proud, almost, of what they didn’t know.”51  
Despite his insecurities, the senator was still greatly respected for his 
ideological contributions. The National Review had written in 1963 that while 
“Goldwater may not be an intellectual…he has those other qualities of mind, 
character, heart and humor that we need in a President.” Noting that Goldwater 
possessed “a good mind, as well as a conscience,” the profile continued that America 
would “require a President possessed not only of charismatic qualities of leadership, 
but also of an intellect decisive, quick, and strong.”52 Despite the praise, Goldwater 
was still uncomfortable with those he viewed as intellectually intimidating. And while 
such well-known academics as Robert Bork and Milton Friedman would advise the 
campaign in various capacities, their expertise would never match the influence of the 
“Arizona Mafia.”53 
* * * 
Thus, Barry Goldwater headed towards the first contest, the New Hampshire 
presidential primary. Despite a campaign team lacking political acumen, the Arizonan 
was the new favorite in the Granite State, whose motto “Live Free or Die” seemed to 
encapsulate so much of what he advocated. Moreover, the Goldwater campaign had 
received an important boost when Senator Norris Cotton, the highest-ranking 
Republican in New Hampshire, agreed to lead his colleague’s primary efforts in the 
state. That Goldwater convinced Cotton, a northeastern moderate, to work on his 
behalf before he even formally announced his campaign was surely a tactful 	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maneuver. Heading a slate of fourteen convention-delegate candidates pledged to 
Goldwater, Cotton provided “an all-out endorsement of the Arizona conservative as a 
national leader.”54 Recognizing the importance of the triumph, Goldwater wrote to his 
fellow senator, “Seldom in the life of any man comes a compliment such as you are 
paying me by your endorsement. I pray that I will never do anything to cause you to 
regret this.”55 
Despite such high profile endorsements, Goldwater’s political opponents were 
also actively preparing for the campaign. In 1962, Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller had 
been the uncontested front-runner for the 1964 Republican presidential nomination. A 
Gallup poll showed him outpacing his nearest rival, Goldwater, by double-digits, 43 
percent to 26 percent.56 The Saturday Evening Post quoted Robert F. Kennedy 
saying, “If it had been Rockefeller instead of Nixon [in 1960], we would have lost.”57 
A year later, the lead virtually reversed, with Goldwater crushing the New Yorker 
nationwide. The single issue that had brought Rockefeller from president-in-waiting 
to third-tier-candidate was his divorce and subsequent remarriage. As Stewart Alsop 
noted, “Rockefeller could have remarried or run for president, but he could not do 
both.”58 “If there’s something about Nelson Rockefeller that doesn’t quite come off, 
despite the squads of PR men who cluster around him,” commented the National 
Review in early 1963, “maybe the reason is he’s just unlucky.”59 By June 1963, the 	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Saturday Evening Post declared that Rockefeller’s new wife “may cost him the 
presidency in 1964.”60  
Desperate to remain relevant, Rockefeller began an all-out assault on the 
party’s new front-runner and the philosophical differences between the two men. 
Referred to as the “Bastille Day Declaration,” Rockefeller delivered a savage 
manifesto against the right wing of his party on July 14, 1963. In an abrupt shift from 
his friendly correspondence in 1960, Rockefeller denounced the Goldwater brand of 
Republicanism, stating it “would not only defeat the Republican Party in 1964 but 
would destroy it altogether.” Moreover, the governor added that the alternative to “the 
unprincipled opportunism” of the Democratic Party “will never be found in a party of 
extremism, a party of sectionalism, a party of racism, a party that disclaims 
responsibility for most of the population before it even starts its campaign for their 
support.”61 While Rockefeller never mentioned Goldwater by name, the desired target 
was clear. More than any other single event, the Rockefeller speech was the definitive 
moment that convinced Goldwater to enter the race.62 
The move that was meant to reinvigorate Rockefeller’s candidacy failed 
tremendously, with philosophical allies such as Richard Nixon and Dwight 
Eisenhower shying away from him because of the speech. By the fall of 1963, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to see how Rockefeller could manage to capture the 
nomination. “The first primary, in New Hampshire, next March,” wrote Stewart 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Joe David Brown, “The Governor’s Happy Lady,” Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1963, 15. 
61 Jack Bell (AP), “Rockefeller Challenges Goldwater: Offers All-Out Liberal vs. Conservative Battle,” 
Indiana Evening Gazette, July 15, 1963, 2. 
62 Edwards, 177. 
In Reckless Pursuit | 60	  	  
 	  
Alsop, “is the hurdle which Rockefeller at all costs must overleap.”63 But with the 
moderate Republican Norris Cotton, someone who should have so easily been 
classified as a Rockefeller ally, squarely for Goldwater, the possibility of an upset 
simply seemed out of reach. 
As much as Rockefeller’s missteps were aiding Goldwater though, the 
senator’s own mistakes were providing easy fodder to his political nemesis. 
Accustomed to the Arizona press, where his blunt rhetoric was appreciated as 
honesty, Goldwater was unprepared for the increasing scrutiny of the national media. 
During his first swing through New Hampshire, Goldwater was already being 
pummeled for remarks he had made. Months earlier, the senator had suggested that 
the entire East Coast should be “cut off and set adrift” because political views 
differed from those of the Midwest, a comment more than offensive to the New 
Hampshire voters he was now courting.64 Even more damaging in the long run, as he 
opened his drive in Concord on January 7, he told reporters he “would favor giving 
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, authority to fire 
tactical atomic weapons without referral to the White House.”65  With a campaign 
staff better equipped to deal with the national press, Goldwater may have been better 
able to clarify his positions, potentially avoiding the dangerous caricature of a nuclear 
war monger. In what would become a months-long debate over Goldwater’s true 
feelings regarding nuclear war, the senator did himself no favors. Only two weeks 
later, Goldwater told a New Hampshire crowd that eventually the United States 
would have to unleash another armed attack against Cuba, prompting the New York 	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Times to ask: “Can the Republican party afford to continue to unleash Barry 
Goldwater?”66 Although it was later disclosed that what Goldwater had suggested 
was also considered under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the fact 
hardly mattered. Goldwater was forever caricatured as a madman hell-bent on 
mutually assured destruction.67 
His missteps were not limited to nuclear weapons either. On January 22, 
Goldwater denounced United States membership in the United Nations because of the 
body’s recognition of Communist China, threatened to cut diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union, and continued to warn voters of America’s internal threat of 
“Fascism on the Left.”68 Days later, the senator was walking back his comments, 
telling a group in Hillsboro that he did not advocate withdrawal from the United 
Nations, but “we ought to do something to make the U.N. better.” The senator was 
also put on the defensive for his criticism of the Social Security system, which he 
now believed should be restructured and made voluntary, a shift from his position 
during the 1952 Senate campaign. Explaining that he was not opposed to the 
program, Goldwater told voters that the government “will have to take a long look at 
Social Security.”69 The message never truly resonated due to the immense popularity 
of the program and Goldwater would be continually defending those poorly chosen 
remarks throughout the rest of the campaign. 
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By the end of January, after less than a month of campaigning, Goldwater saw 
his wide lead quickly fade. “I don’t think the outcome can possibly be convincing, as 
of now,” the candidate told reporters in Washington, referring to the likelihood of a 
primary victory.70 The spiral downward was most readily due to Goldwater’s own 
loose style, but also to the amateurish operation ran haphazardly by Kitchel and 
Burch. In comparison, Rockefeller’s operation was well financed, relentlessly 
efficient and “highly professional.”71 While Senator Cotton had refused to head 
Rockefeller’s delegate drive, another well-respected New Hampshire politician, 
former Governor Hugh Gregg, had agreed.72 The New York millionaire was 
funneling nearly $200,000 through donations from his mother and brothers, and was 
running television ads on nearby Massachusetts stations in order to keep within the 
New Hampshire expenditure limits.73 Easily portraying Goldwater as an out-of-touch 
extremist, Rockefeller cast himself as the safe alternative, well within the Republican 
mainstream. “How can there be security when he wants to take the United States out 
of the United Nations,” Rockefeller asked a Concord crowd of his opponent, “How 
can there be sanity when he wants to give area commanders the authority to make 
decisions on the use of nuclear weapons?”74 The governor continued to use 
Goldwater’s unfortunate remarks on Social Security throughout the campaign, 
charging that a voluntary system would result in bankruptcy “and be a personal 
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disaster to millions of senior citizens and their families.” “I would preserve and 
protect social security,” Rockefeller stated in Keene, “because I understand it and 
support it.”75  
In response, the Goldwater camp remained paralyzed. Months earlier, Peter F. 
O’Donnell, the former Texas Republican Party chairman and an associate of Clif 
White, had warned Kitchel and Burch not to settle for the defensive. “Damage 
control,” O’Donnell cautioned, “pitted Goldwater’s image, and inhibited the 
mobilization of supporters and funds.”76 Upon visiting New Hampshire, O’Donnell 
advised Kitchel that there were serious flaws in the organization that could lead to 
disaster, including the campaign’s political messaging and its underutilization of the 
national grassroots movement. “We stand a great chance of being clobbered,” 
O’Donnell wrote in December 1963.77 But Kitchel, and especially Goldwater, did not 
want to hear it. O’Donnell was an outsider. Despite his strenuous efforts as chairman 
of the Draft Goldwater Committee, the Arizona Mafia would not trust him. The 
tremendous groundwork that White’s committee had spent years developing had been 
completely ignored by Kitchel and his staff and the ramifications were being felt. Had 
Shadegg, White or O’Donnell been in charge of the campaign, it is likely that a 
different strategy would have been chosen in order to better highlight the senator’s 
positions. By February 10, the campaign summary noted that local correspondents 
predicted that Goldwater could still “come out ahead but with no clearcut victory.”78 
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As the campaign stretched into February, Goldwater’s chances of victory 
continued to rapidly fade. In the February 18 summary report, the campaign staff 
wrote, “Rocky getting good crowds, takes more advantage of them than does BG.” 
The Portsmouth Herald noted that Goldwater’s February 20 crowd was less than half 
the size of Rockefeller’s a few days earlier.79 In addition, Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, had also become the subject of a devoted 
following as a write-in candidate. Although he remained in Saigon, miles away from 
active participation or interest, New Hampshire election laws stipulated that a 
candidate could be put forward as a write-in by anyone. There’s “lots of Lodge 
money,” the Goldwater campaign reported, “In his campaign literature, he now 
claims the lead.”80 Still, Goldwater and his team were hopeful.  
The senator was working relentlessly, making nearly a dozen campaign stops 
a day. But he still had not fully recovered from his December foot surgery and he 
remained irritated by the nasty campaign Rockefeller was waging.81 The combination 
made the senator stressed, agitated and bitter. While the New York Times argued in 
early February that Goldwater was still the favorite to win the primary, an Associated 
Press poll showed that he was losing ground. Supported by 22 New Hampshire 
committeemen in an October survey, Goldwater fell to 14 by February. “Mr. 
Goldwater,” the New York Times wrote, “despite recent hard campaigning, has not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 “Goldwater Directs Heavy Fire At Johnson’s Administration,” Portsmouth Herald, February 21, 
1964, 1.	  
80 Goldwater Special Report Summary, February 18, 1964, Folder 7, Box 141, Goldwater Papers 
(ASU). 
81 Theodore White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Antheneum Publishers, 1965), 307.	  
In Reckless Pursuit | 65	  	  
 	  
improved his position.”82 Increasingly frustrated, and taking Rockefeller’s bait, 
Goldwater began lashing out at his opponent, appearing mean and angry. He stated 
that Rockefeller was in the pocket of union bosses like Jimmy Hoffa. Rehashing his 
long-held anti-labor sentiments, Goldwater argued that labor leaders were the reason 
for his slide in the polls. The charge drew an angry response from William Loeb, 
publisher of the Manchester Union-Leader and a devoted Goldwater supporter. In a 
February 20 editorial, Loeb chastised Goldwater on the meaning of conservatism: 
Conservatism does not consist, Sen. Goldwater, of fighting with labor unions 
or blaming the confusion about your views…on the head of the Teamster’s 
Union…The trouble is, however, you have not made [your views] clear and 
have thus laid yourself open to attack. Don’t blame labor unions for this. 
Blame yourself and your public relations staff.83 
 
It seemed that Goldwater was actually making more enemies than supporters as he 
thumped through New Hampshire. After Loeb’s editorial, and a rumor that Senator 
Cotton had threatened to resign, Goldwater’s advisors wrote, “‘Family trouble’ 
hurting Goldwater campaign…victory in NH will be ‘in spite’ of his friends.”84 More 
importantly, he was further alienating an already distant press corps. In a campaign 
summary, the staff wrote that Del Marbrook, a new reporter from the Concord 
Monitor, had “tried hard to get along with Goldwater but was badly treated.”85  
Senator Cotton had urged his colleague that in order to win he needed to 
employ a “Kefauver strategy,” a reference to Democrat Estes Kefauver’s upset 
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victory over Harry Truman in the 1952 New Hampshire primary. The formula was 
straightforward: “Try to shake hands with as many of the expected one hundred 
thousand Republican voters as possible between January 7 and March 10.” But while 
Goldwater had once thrived on the personal touches of campaigning, he now found 
them unbefitting. During some of the tours arranged by his staff, Goldwater “would 
plow through, eyes straight ahead, shaking no hands, and giving no greetings.” On 
February 19 he blurted out to a group of supporters, “I’m not one of these baby-
kissing, handshaking, blintz-eating candidates.”86  In a state like New Hampshire, 
where retail politicking was glorified, observers were horror-struck. Meanwhile, 
Rockefeller was moving “full steam ahead” with the candidate planning a full-on 
assault between March 1 and the March 10 primary.87  
The campaign seemed almost hopeless by February 22, when the campaign 
staff noted, “All reports seem to indicate that BG has been sliding. Rocky gaining 
ground.”88 Further, with only a little more than a week before the primary, Concord 
newspapers were predicting that Rockefeller would edge out Goldwater by 2,000 
votes.89 Despite the discouraging news, Goldwater remained optimistic. Instead of 
conceding defeat, he began to raise expectations. On March 6, Goldwater told a large 
crowd in Concord that he expected to receive 40 percent in the election, an increase 
from what he had predicted a week earlier. “He said that the estimates of his vote 
made by him and his advisers were going up ‘almost hourly,’” reported the New York 
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Times. Despite the pitfalls though, it appeared that Goldwater had finally figured out 
his campaigning strengths, focusing on emotional themes rather than more specific 
policy points. Momentum was beginning to build. At a Deerfield town hall an elderly 
woman grabbed Goldwater’s hand and told him, “You’re the only man I’ve wanted to 
vote for the Presidency since Teddy Roosevelt.” “He showed himself [to be] an able 
sidewalk campaigner,” commented columnist Charles Mohr after his stump speech.90 
For the first time, the candidate was also staying on message, delivering remarks in 
Durham on his themes of good government and solid principles. “Public office,” 
Goldwater declared, “is an office bestowed upon those who share your values and in 
whom you can believe. No grab-bag of political promises is as important as this basic 
agreement.”91 
The burst of energy was still too little, too late. While he had been cordial and 
friendly on March 6, earlier that week his tone was still described as “almost harsh.” 
Spending the majority of his speech in Berlin, New Hampshire, criticizing Nelson 
Rockefeller, Goldwater dismissed his opponent as “me-too echoes of the Democrats,” 
as he bitterly pledged to take on the governor in the New York primary.92 Meanwhile, 
Rockefeller was spending thousands of dollars pummeling the airwaves with a 
myriad of advertisements. Under the keen command of P.R. firm Fuller, Smith & 
Ross, the Rockefeller campaign had purchased airtime from major television 
companies in Boston, Poland Springs, Maine and Burlington, Vermont. “Rocky 
looms an even choice to beat Barry,” the campaign advisers wrote in a memo on 	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March 7. Even more revealing, for the first time Ambassador Lodge was viewed as a 
growing threat. “The amateurs running the Lodge write-in may surprise the nation,” 
the memo read, “They have sharp organization in some spots, and the Lodge name is 
hot.”93 The potential danger of Lodge’s candidacy was correct, but recognized too 
late. The inability of Goldwater’s staff to judge Lodge as a credible threat earlier was 
a fatal mistake and made the remaining primary process much more difficult. 
As the primary came to a close, the individual campaigns flew into full gear. 
Goldwater, in a “confident declaration,” told supporters, “I have it made.” Despite the 
growing confirmation that he would not win the primary, he continued to increase 
expectations of his performance, predicting he would take up to 10 of the state’s 14 
delegates. While 35 percent would be a “decisive victory,” Goldwater was still 
confident he would receive 40 percent, and his advisers were reportedly even more 
optimistic.94 As for Lodge, Goldwater stated he would not be surprised if the 
ambassador came in second.95 In his final weekend of campaigning, Rockefeller 
issued no attacks against Senator Goldwater or President Johnson as he focused his 
energy in urban areas, such as Nashua, Amherst and Manchester. The small towns 
and rural areas of the north were written off as Goldwater territory.96 Predicting their 
candidate would receive 27,000 votes, the draft-Lodge officials compared Lodge’s 
position to Dwight Eisenhower’s upset victory over Robert Taft in 1952.97 
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As voters headed to the polls on March 10, the day of the primary, Goldwater 
received a morning telegram from his children: “Believe in God and your country we 
believe in you.”98 The senator came in a distant second, capturing only 21,775 votes. 
Although he had managed to beat Rockefeller by less than 2,000 votes, Ambassador 
Lodge, without ever setting foot in the state, won with an overwhelming 33,000 
votes, surpassing even his supporters’ best predictions.99 While the Associated 
Press’s Jack Bell had predicted “some spectacular fireworks,” the Lodge victory 
surpassed any observer’s expectations.100  
Stunned by the results, all Goldwater could say was that he had “goofed up 
somewhere.”101 Still, the signs of an energetic Lodge insurgency had been clearly 
present. A well-respected member of the party establishment from neighboring 
Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge should never have been underestimated. If there 
was anyone who competed with Rockefeller to be Goldwater’s most dreaded enemy, 
it was surely Lodge. An elitist, Ivy Leaguer from the northeast, the former senator 
represented everything Goldwater detested about the Republican Party. A famous 
poem, which originated at a Holy Cross Alumni Dinner in 1910, described Lodge’s 
pedigree and outlook: “And this is good old Boston / The home of the bean and the 
cod / Where the Lodges speak only to Cabots / And the Cabots speak only to God.”102 
Moreover, Goldwater despised Lodge for his lackluster campaigning as the vice 
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presidential nominee in 1960 (one of the reasons Goldwater underestimated him) and 
for crossing party lines to accept Kennedy’s ambassadorial nomination. “We are not 
going to beat the Democrats with a man who will campaign only once a day,” 
Goldwater quipped, referring to Lodge’s 1960 schedule.103 While Goldwater had 
considered dropping his campaign after New Hampshire, in some ways the result 
must have energized him. He had never lost an election before and now he was ready 
to work. New Hampshire “got his dander up,” said Clif White.104 The Friday after the 
New Hampshire primary, Goldwater was already in California, where the biggest 
contest would be held on June 2. California was a bastion of conservative uprising, 
one of the most energetic centers of the Draft Goldwater movement, and to Barry 
Goldwater the Golden State primary would be different.  
* * * 
In the months before that final showdown in California, which would most likely 
decide the 1964 Republican nominee, Goldwater and his rivals jockeyed for 
momentum. Despite his defeat in New Hampshire, Goldwater picked up victories in 
Illinois, Texas, Indiana and Nebraska. Rockefeller won primaries in West Virginia 
and Oregon. Novak commented:  
It was as if the Red Queen in Through the Looking Glass had planned the 
elections of 1964—all should win, all should have a prize. Lodge should have 
New Hampshire, Rockefeller should have Oregon, Goldwater should have 
California—and Lyndon Johnson should have the country.105  
 
 On April 9, 1964, Novak and Evans wrote in their national column that a new 
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percent a month earlier. But Novak and Evans cautioned that while Barry Goldwater 
had been “pronounced dead weeks ago,” after the New Hampshire primary, he “may 
have been a victim of premature burial.”106 Licking their wounds, the infant 
Goldwater staff reassessed their strategy. The team blamed the loss on an unfair 
media bias and a grueling campaign schedule.107 California would become the 
glimmer of hope that showed the true potential of the Goldwater organization. 
Headed into California, the number of appearances would be scaled back, press 
access would be limited and the candidate would speak only in the broad generalities 
that seemed to resonate towards the end of the New Hampshire primary. Moreover, in 
the West, Goldwater felt more at home. He was confident and eager, and had nearly 
50,000 die-hard volunteers at his disposal. Despite the New Hampshire setback, the 
campaign was steadily raising money, taking in close to $1 million for the primary 
campaign.108 Perhaps most importantly, Kitchel and the Arizona Mafia realized they 
needed help, and the New Hampshire defeat forced them to recognize the expertise of 
Clif White. 
 Dick Kleindheist worked to have White appointed his co-director of field 
operations, bringing him back from obscurity and placing him in firm control.109  The 
Goldwater campaign had been building an organization in California since January. 
Under the tutelage of Western Management Consultants, a team of professionals 
based in Phoenix, the campaign identified key strongholds where Goldwater should 
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devote his plentiful resources.110 William Knowland, who had served as a U.S. 
Senator from California until 1959 and was now publisher of the Oakland Tribune, 
agreed to head the state operations for the campaign. In addition, Assemblyman 
Joseph Shell, who had challenged Nixon for the gubernatorial nomination in 1962, 
also joined the state campaign committee.111  
Knowland and White, along with Lee Edwards who had been brought on as 
public information director, worked together to devise a new strategy of working to 
collect delegates at the county and precinct level, rather than following the previous 
“Kefauver strategy” of reaching individual primary voters. These men understood 
that it would be the convention delegates that would actually select the Republican 
nominee in July.112 Dean Burch, who had proven himself to be more capable than 
expected at Washington headquarters, was also sent to California. Novak credits the 
efficient California operation to Burch’s ability, noting that his presence brought “a 
degree of coordination to the campaign for the first time.”113  
 While there were certainly many assets to the California Goldwater 
organization, there was also plenty that needed to be improved. The California 
Republican Party had been fractured since 1958, when Senator Knowland and 
Governor Goodwin Knight switched races, with each running for the other’s office. 
They both went down in disastrous defeat. Further, Richard Nixon’s unsuccessful 
return to politics through the 1962 gubernatorial race had split the state party, creating 
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deep divisions. The far-right grassroots organizations had steadily grown since then, 
and by 1963 “the formation of a new Republican organization in California which is 
distinctly conservative in spirit” was evident. Moreover, there was “not the slightest 
doubt that the new California organization…[would] strive for the nomination of Sen. 
Barry Goldwater at the 1964 convention.”114 While this new groundswell of 
conservatism was powerful, it was also difficult to control.115 
As early as January 1964, consultants had warned that Knowland’s 
conservatism had led the Republicans to defeat in 1958 and “the Goldwater people 
are making the same mistakes, taking violent sides” on local issues, such as “right-to-
work” laws, fair housing and constitutional amendments.116 But the enthusiasm 
grassroots activists had for Goldwater’s candidacy was nonetheless unprecedented. 
As Goldwater attempted to qualify for the California primary by collecting the 
required 13,000 signatures, the organization proved remarkably effective, collecting 
86,000 in two days. In contrast, Nelson Rockefeller relied on pay-per-signature 
professionals and was still struggling to attain the required number a week before the 
deadline.117  
Still, victory was far from assured. “Despite this advantage in manpower 
quality,” an internal campaign memo announced, “the Goldwater quarterback still 
seems pressing for a victory…anything can happen.”118 Incumbent Republican 
Senator Thomas Kuchel had endorsed Rockefeller early in the race, and the New 
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Yorker could also count on the support of other California luminaries, including Earl 
Warren, Eisenhower Labor Secretary James Mitchell and Congressman William S. 
Mailliard.119 Unlike New Hampshire, write-in campaigns were not allowed under 
California election law and so this primary would be a one-on-one fistfight between 
Goldwater and Rockefeller. As the Associated Press described it, California would 
“be a two-man contest between the big losers” of months earlier.120  
Also in Rockefeller’s favor was the campaign script that had already been 
written in New Hampshire, as well as the energy within the GOP establishment. 
Rockefeller campaign hand Stuart Spencer reflected years later that the Rockefeller 
strategy had always been straightforward: “We had to destroy Barry Goldwater as a 
member of the human race.”121 And all the material they needed was already 
available. Moreover, liberal Republicans across the country were well aware that 
California might be the last chance to deny Goldwater the nomination. In an April 30 
campaign memo, correspondents in California wrote, “There is a definite stop-
Goldwater movement afoot here…Rockefeller forces seem to be facing certain 
defeat, but are hoping to make hay out of the movement.”122 With a sizeable and 
unexpected victory in Oregon less than a month earlier reinvigorating his candidacy, 
and because it was almost certainly his last shot, Rockefeller was determined to fight 
hard. And he would wage a particularly nasty campaign. The inevitable bare-
knuckled contest would define the intraparty conduct in the general election with 
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Goldwater refusing to make peace with the liberal faction, and the liberal faction 
refusing to actively support Goldwater. 
Portraying himself as the de facto leader of the Republican mainstream, in the 
mold of Nixon, Lodge and Scranton, Rockefeller rehashed the same talking points 
against Goldwater’s “extremism.” “Which do you want,” a new Rockefeller ad read, 
“A Leader—or a Loner?” It pictured Rockefeller surrounded by his fellow 
Republican candidates above the slogan: “These men stand together on the party’s 
principles.” Pictured off to the side, alone, the slogan below Goldwater read:  
“This man stands outside.”123  Goldwater responded on May 28 that he had “never 
heard of anything like this in a primary where all the rest gang up on one.” And while 
he cleared Nixon and Scranton of being involved in the Rockefeller campaign, he also 
declared himself “the only serious candidate” in the race.124  
The senator remained on message though, dismissing Rockefeller’s criticisms 
by stressing party unity. Goldwater also changed his rhetoric on nuclear weapons, 
U.S. membership in the United Nations and Social Security. The New York Times 
noted he had “softened the speech and reined the combativeness,” appearing “not so 
militant and belligerent as he used to be.”125 When Goldwater was told that the 
governor had referred to him as “out of the mainstream” the senator merely 
responded, “I don’t pay any attention to what Governor Rockefeller says.”126 When 
Rockefeller charged that his opponent did not represent “responsible Republicanism,” 
Goldwater simply amended his stances. Without giving specifics, the senator said of 	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Social Security, “I favor a sound Social Security system and I want to see it 
strengthened.”127 The remarks did not contradict his statements in New Hampshire, 
but merely phrased them more obliquely. It seemed that Barry Goldwater had finally 
figured out how to run for president. 
The budding Goldwater strategy did not seem to make a difference though. A 
May 26 Harris poll showed Rockefeller with 51 percent to Goldwater’s 41 percent. A 
Field poll from the same period gave Rockefeller 46 percent to Goldwater’s 33 
percent.128 Then, suddenly, everything changed. On May 30, Governor Rockefeller 
and his new wife announced the birth of Nelson Jr., marking possibly the worst 
timing in American political history.129 The lead Rockefeller had commanded for 
months evaporated overnight and a June 1 poll showed the candidates virtually tied at 
42 percent to 40 percent. In an article for the Washington Post, pollster Louis Harris 
wrote, “The vote for Rockefeller remains soft and even mushy” as the infamous tales 
of his divorce and remarriage rushed back into the minds of voters.130 
“We’re going to win,” Goldwater told the Los Angeles Times the night before 
the election. With fresh polls showing a closer race than expected, the senator added, 
“I’ve never been so confident.”131 By 7:30 pm the California primary was called in 
Barry Goldwater’s favor in a narrow 51 percent to 48 percent result. With the Golden 
State’s 86 delegates firmly in the Arizonan’s column, Nelson Rockefeller predicted 
on June 4 that the nomination would be Goldwater’s on the first ballot.132 A Gallup 
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poll released after the election noted that support was quietly coalescing behind 
Goldwater among Republican delegates, with his victory enhancing his image 
nationwide.133  
California had changed the nature of the Republican Party for generations. 
Historian Richard Hofstadter would write towards the end of the general election, 
“When, in all our history, has anyone with ideas so bizarre, so archaic, so self-
confounding, so remote from the basic American consensus, ever gone so far?”134 But 
as McGirr noted, California was not representative of the nation as a whole. “True to 
its leading role in the grassroots conservative movement,” McGirr wrote, 
“[California] reversed the national trend and sided resoundingly with Goldwater.”135 
Walter Lippmann agreed. “California is by no means a true sample of the Republican 
Party,” he wrote in his national column, “Sen. Barry Goldwater’s victory in 
California is the beginning, not the end, of the drama and ordeal of the Republican 
Party.”136  
As he moved tantalizing close to seizing his party’s nomination, Goldwater’s 
organization had seemed to finally come together. He had managed to espouse the 
same ideological views that had guided him since his first campaign for the United 
States Senate in 1952, but neutralize his opponent’s attacks and rein in his own 
flamboyant oratory. At the same time, his inexperienced managers had matured 
through turbulent trials on the national stage. But Lippmann was right. This was only 
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the beginning of the 1964 campaign and while he had seized the nomination, the task 
of uniting his party behind his candidacy would become Goldwater’s greatest 
challenge. 
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IV. NO TURNING BACK 
 
 
Writing to the Oakland Tribune in July 1964, only weeks before Barry 
Goldwater would become the Republican nominee for president, Garrett Odell of 
Hempstead, New York vehemently defended the Arizonan against his critics. “What 
Republicans need is a man, not a party,” Odell wrote, “and the man is Mr. 
Goldwater.”1 That same month, Charles Christiano of Arizona condemned his state’s 
senator, writing to the Tucson Daily Citizen: “The civil rights issue concerns me more 
than Barry Goldwater’s ‘principles.’ The ‘rights’ of millions of exploited people 
outweigh Barry’s ‘principles.’”2 The senator’s reluctance to effectively address the 
issues of civil rights, Social Security and nuclear weapons led to some of his harshest 
criticisms. His inability to articulate his views made his ideology appear harsh, 
archaic and outdated. Moreover, Goldwater’s style was so unpolished that it often 
opened his views to caricature, distorting his true positions.  At the same time though, 
Goldwater’s blunt forwardness won immense loyalty from a devoted following and 
was among his most admired qualities. “You see that building over there?” one 
devoted fan said, “If Goldwater told me to jump off it, I wouldn’t even ask why. I’d 
just go jump.”3 Barry Goldwater had clearly become a divisive national figure with a 
force that could either rally individuals to passionate support or emotional opposition. 
 Even before becoming a presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater had attracted 
an impressive following. Compared to Theodore Roosevelt for his steadfast 
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independence and Harry Truman for his confidence despite being the ultimate 
underdog, Goldwater was seen as a politician with potential.4 Tom Wicker wrote that 
“an air of unreality” hung over the rise of the Arizonan, who Wicker noted was “not a 
philosopher, an intellectual or a high-powered political manipulator.” Still, 
professional observers like Wicker remained unconvinced. The Goldwater movement, 
to Wicker and others like him, seemed merely a coalition of “professional 
exploiters—fake preachers…fake professors…Southern Kleagles [and] financiers of 
the far-right.”5 David Lawrence wrote that Goldwater’s esteem was simply due to his 
“evident conviction” against the Democratic administration, adding, “The Arizona 
senator’s popularity is related to the spontaneous response of many Republican voters 
who feel he reflects their militancy.”6 
 Often derided as “nuts and kooks,” the adherents of “Goldwaterism” quickly 
showed that they were far more than just “the little old ladies in tennis shoes.”7 
Months after his initial assessment of Goldwater’s presidential ambitions, Wicker 
made minor adjustments to his analysis. Although Goldwater had appeared to be a 
“minor-league extremist,” he “had a far broader base of support” than Wicker 
suspected. Still, Wicker believed that this was simply because of “the Senator’s 
personal attractiveness” or the understanding within the Republican Party that 
because no candidate could defeat Lyndon Johnson, “this was the year to ‘let the 
conservatives have it.’”8 While Wicker’s speculation regarding the Republican 
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establishment was incorrect, others agreed with his assessment of Goldwater’s 
personal appeal. Joseph Loftus had also written that the Right envisioned their leader 
as “warlike,” and that both men and women were attracted to Goldwater because of 
his “ruggedly handsome good looks.” Loftus, though, conceded that the senator’s 
“moral courage” also played a role in his popularity.9 Robert E. Arnold attempted to 
explain the growing fascination with Goldwater to the Wall Street Journal. In a Letter 
to the Editor, Arnold wrote that he found Goldwater’s followers “distressing” in their 
“hopes for a magical reversal of history” that they believed would accompany a 
Goldwater presidency, touching on the very reason why individuals like Garrett Odell 
of Hempstead, New York saw him as the country’s last hope.10  
 As commentators across the country tried to explain the Goldwater 
phenomenon, these devoted followers excitedly made their way to San Francisco to 
formally anoint their candidate as the leader of their party. While the entire contest 
for the Republican nomination had been bitter, ugly and juvenile, those months of 
grueling campaigning would pale in comparison to the events that would transpire 
over the course of four days at the Cow Palace.  
After the California primary on June 2, Goldwater had virtually sealed the 
nomination. Despite the loss, the Eastern establishment, which had dominated the 
nominating conventions for decades, refused to give in. Under the direction of Nelson 
Rockefeller, the liberal wing of the party was determined to thwart Goldwater’s 
golden moment. Only ten days after he lost the California primary, Rockefeller 	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warned that “the positions taken by the Arizonan could spell disaster for the 
Republican party and the country.” Firmly in control as the chairman of New York’s 
92-member delegation, Rockefeller declared that he would fight “all the way in San 
Francisco” to ensure “responsible Republican principles of moderation.” Former 
Governor Thomas Dewey, the nominee in 1944 and 1948, was actively pushing his 
protégé to fight to the finish, but New York as a whole was far from united behind 
Rockefeller. Congressman William Miller of Niagara, chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, declared that the party was obligated to unite around 
Goldwater.11 But while Goldwater was assured of securing the Republican 
nomination, the process would not be pleasant. The actions of liberal Republicans at 
the convention, and the reactions of their conservative counterparts, would set the 
tone for the uphill general election campaign against a united and energized 
Democratic Party. “The immediate problem for Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona 
and the Republicans,” wrote the Washington Star, “will be reunification of the 
Republican Party.”12 
Goldwater was uninterested in leading a united party though. In the days 
leading up to the opening of the national convention, Goldwater seemed to quit 
campaigning all together. It was a return to the reluctance he demonstrated during the 
beginning of the campaign. “National politics has seen nothing quite like this since 
Franklin D. Roosevelt stayed home in Albany before the 1932 Democratic 
convention—while James A. Farley scoured the country for delegates,” commented 	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the Washington Post. And while the paper referred to the senator as “one of the 
coolest modern candidates” for his interest in beefed-up ham radios and sports cars, it 
also noted that the aggressive pace he had adopted during the California primary 
seemed to be missing.13 Obviously, Goldwater should have been actively preparing 
for the general election. A Gallup poll released on July 1 showed Lyndon B. Johnson 
outpacing the presumptive Republican nominee by nearly 60 points. Moreover, 
Goldwater performed worse in the poll than Richard Nixon or Governor William 
Scranton of Pennsylvania in hypothetical match-ups, although all three were soundly 
defeated by Johnson.14  
The candidate also had a significant amount of explaining left to do. His 
policy statements were so ambiguous that the majority of Americans believed the 
distorted views presented by Rockefeller in the primaries, making the clarification of 
his policies a struggle.15 Goldwater made matters worse by jockeying between broad 
generalities and blunt rhetoric, both of which appeared radical and harsh. In Arizona, 
Goldwater’s frankness had won accolades as honesty, but on the national stage it gave 
the impression that Goldwater had not fully developed his positions. In the California 
primary, his broad generalities had helped save his tattered image, but now he lumped 
subjects together, such as hashing out one-liners on foreign policy to Midwestern 
farmers who cared more about federal subsidies.  
Congressional Quarterly noted that Goldwater’s “stand on a number of issues 
have become points of serious controversy,” including his positions on the use of 	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nuclear weapons, the United Nations, Social Security and civil rights because of a 
combination of the bluntness that made him appear radical, and the ambiguity that 
made it hard for onlookers to know whether he actually was or not. The CQ “Fact 
Sheet” continued, “The record shows that Goldwater has never made some of the 
most controversial proposals attributed to him by opponents, such as abolishing 
Social Security or doing away with the income tax.”16 But on July 5, the New York 
Times published a collection of positions Goldwater had taken, commenting: 
The senator often speaks of “principles,” and his supporters admire him as a 
man of rugged adherence to strong views no matter what they may cost him. 
But when one searches his past statements to apply this general philosophy to 
particular issues, it is apparent that his concrete proposals have been changing. 
Goldwater, the serious candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, 
was quite different from Goldwater, the Arizona senator, and Goldwater the 
prospective nominee, is more moderate still.17 
 
While his movement towards the political center would be typical of a presumptive 
nominee, it was difficult to understand given his reputation for strict principles. The 
sudden shift was so sloppy that it confused observers who had only known Goldwater 
as the unchallenged spokesman of right-wing conservatism. For months, his primary 
opponents had distorted his record so much that it was difficult to decipher where 
Goldwater actually stood. Moreover, the moderates of his own party continued to 
distance themselves from him, despite his efforts to soften his ideology. Governor 
Scranton called Goldwater “impulsive” to explain why the senator was unqualified to 
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be president, as did Ambassador Lodge upon his return to the United States from 
Saigon.18 Clearly, his repeated “clarifications” were not resonating.  
The public concurred with the attacks by Goldwater’s political opponents. In a 
“Letter to the Editor” to the Wall Street Journal, Andrew Patterson of Alexandria, 
Virginia wrote, “As a citizen I am appalled by the lack of knowledge about our 
Government as displayed by Senator Goldwater and his supporters.” With Goldwater 
and his supporters cast as “extremists” because of caricatured beliefs, Patterson 
continued, “It is disgusting that there are leaders in the Republican Party who abstain 
from acting to stop the Goldwater movement for the sake of maintaining ‘party 
unity.’”19 But that was hardly the case. Rockefeller had been responsible for many of 
the misrepresentations of Goldwater’s ideology, and he was determined to continue to 
paint a portrait of a troglodyte extremist.  As his own prospects doused, Rockefeller 
quietly pushed Scranton to challenge Goldwater on the floor of the convention, 
ensuring a fight that would weaken the nominee. 
William W. Scranton, described by Novak as a multimillionaire “whose 
family had been contributing to the Republican Party since the days of Abraham 
Lincoln,” “was wise enough to keep his mouth shut when committing heresy.”20 
Other moderate governors had been discussed as presidential timber along with 
Rockefeller, including George Romney, Mark Hatfield and Scranton. For months 
Scranton quietly flirted with the possibility of running for president, observing the 
actions of Nixon, Lodge and, of course, Rockefeller. But once it became clear that 	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none of the three would be desirable to convention delegates, the Eastern 
establishment, led by Rockefeller, began to gently nudge the soft-spoken 
Pennsylvanian towards the spotlight. If Goldwater’s grappling with the decision to 
run was reluctance, then Scranton was displaying outright unwillingness. As 
Goldwater and Rockefeller dueled in New Hampshire and California, Scranton 
waited. In April, Scranton insisted he would not be a candidate, but still suggested his 
supporters try to draft him. The non-campaign strategy was to count “on the 
convention’s turning to the Governor after other candidates fail to receive a majority 
of votes on the early ballots,” resulting in a third or fourth ballot compromise.21 While 
Scranton often shied from the national spotlight, “the assassination of President 
Kennedy transformed him instantly from a very dark horse into a fairly bright 
prospect” for the nomination.22 Prodded by Rockefeller and newly eager to make his 
mark on the national scene, Scranton was swooned into the contest. 
 Internally conflicted, he traveled to Gettysburg in early June to visit his most 
famous constituent, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Scranton was granted a total of 85 
minutes with the former president, leading many to believe that Eisenhower was 
actively working to stop Goldwater by propping up his fellow Pennsylvanian. And 
while Eisenhower later denied any desire to influence the convention, he was hardly 
enthusiastic about Goldwater’s likely nomination. In a letter from a year earlier, 
Eisenhower associate Bryce N. Harlow, who had served as special assistant to 
Eisenhower, wrote him regarding the Republican front-runner. Harlow noted that 	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Eisenhower had been a frequent target of Goldwater in several columns he had 
written for the Los Angeles Times in the early 1960s, and the senator continued to 
hold the former president partly responsible for the Cuban missile crisis and the 
construction of the Berlin Wall. “On examination of most of this material,” Harlow 
concluded, “Goldwater’s only consistent refrain respecting your Administration has 
been that you and he have seemingly agreed on virtually all matters of Republican 
principle but, Goldwater contends, you were driven off course by ‘liberal advisers.’”23 
Therefore, it was not entirely unrealistic to assume Eisenhower was, in fact, pushing 
his home state executive to save his Republican Party.  
Regardless of what Eisenhower actually said in Gettysburg, the meeting 
surely had a strong effect on Scranton’s mindset. Shorty after his meeting with the 
former president, Scranton “opened a fighting campaign for convention delegates,” 
just as Goldwater had seemingly wrapped up the nomination in California. As 
Scranton opened his campaign in Des Moines, Iowa, Goldwater supporters 
interrupted his speech with shouts of “We want Barry,” a constant reminder of the 
odds Scranton truly faced.24  
Despite most pundits writing him off, Scranton still believed he could “upset 
the well-organized team that intends to nominate Sen. Barry Goldwater.” “Why does 
the Pennsylvanian refuse to play dead?” asked the Los Angeles Times. The answer, 
wrote Don Irwin, was the conviction that “Goldwater’s ‘extremism’ represents a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Among the “liberal advisers” referenced was most likely Harlow himself. Harlow to Eisenhower, 
July 15, 1963, Folder 6, Box 6, Goldwater Papers (ASU). 
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mortal threat to the Republican Party that is a part of Scranton’s inheritance.”25 Some 
Republicans concurred. Mrs. Rolph Stoddard of California wrote Republican 
National Committee Chairman William Miller urging the convention to select 
Scranton. “A President of the United States has to be strong; not full of as many 
varied opinions as Barry Goldwater,” she argued.26 “We feel that [Scranton] more 
nearly represents the various elements of the Party and will attract more votes in 
November than will Goldwater,” added Mrs. Robert M. Burnett of Chicago, Illinois, 
“Although we respect Barry Goldwater for the courage of his own convictions, we 
believe that HIS convictions are not those of the majority.”27 
The eve of the convention Scranton scorched any existing shreds of party 
unity, convincing Goldwater that the philosophical differences could not be 
reconciled. In the early evening of July 12, Goldwater received a hand-delivered letter 
from the Pennsylvania governor. “Will the convention choose the candidate 
overwhelmingly favored by the Republican voters,” the letter read, “or will it choose 
you?” The remainder of the 1,200-word treatise continued in the same tone:  
You have too often casually prescribed nuclear war as a solution to a troubled 
world. You have too often allowed the radical extremists to use you. You have 
too often stood for irresponsibility in the serious question of racial holocaust. 
You have too often read Taft and Eisenhower and Lincoln out of the 
Republican Party…the Republican Party is fighting for its soul.28 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Don Irwin, “Extremism Threat to Party Propelled Scranton Into Race,” Los Angeles Times, July 12, 
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Continually linking Goldwater to extremism, the letter accused the senator of 
preaching “nuclear irresponsibility” and being “afraid to forthrightly condemn right-
wing extremists.” In closing, the letter challenged Goldwater to a debate before the 
convention, taunting him with the expectation that he would never accept, and daring 
him to defend his ideology before the American people—as if he had not been doing 
exactly that for six months on the campaign trail. And while Goldwater was furious 
upon reading it, he also remarked to Clif White, “This doesn’t sound like Bill.” 
Curiously, the letter was not signed by the governor, with “William W. Scranton” 
simply typed out. In fact, Scranton had never even seen the letter. It had been written 
by an aide, William Keisling (with prompting from Nelson Rockefeller, some 
suspect), and approved by his campaign manager.29  
In response, and before Scranton’s innocence could be proven, the Goldwater 
campaign hastily released it to the press and the delegates, along with an addendum. 
Goldwater speechwriter Harry Jaffa, a political scientist from Claremont College, 
remarked that the letter reminded him of a fiery New York Tribune editorial Horace 
Greeley had penned against Abraham Lincoln one-hundred years earlier. Lincoln had 
replied, “If there be perceptible in it [the editorial] an impatient and dictatorial tone, I 
waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be 
right.” This brief statement was attached to every delegate’s copy and distributed. 
“This ought to make it 1,000 for you on the first ballot,” White told the senator.30 
White was correct; delegates who had never considered voting for Goldwater were so 	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infuriated by Scranton’s poor sportsmanship that they pledged their support. 
However, the letter also hardened ideological divisions. Goldwater had truly viewed 
Scranton as a friend and had seriously considered him for the vice presidential 
nomination, but Scranton’s bitter campaign had ended all that. The Washington Star 
described the scene, writing, “The harshness of Gov. William Scranton’s last-ditch 
fight against Senator Barry Goldwater surprised the Senator and upset his strategy for 
the election campaign against President Johnson.”31 “Frankly,” Goldwater told the 
Associated Press, “after the things he has said about me I don’t know how either of us 
would be comfortable running with the other.”32 The hope for party unity had been 
extinguished, just as Rockefeller hoped, predicted and planned. 
 With their enemies’ desperate frustration reaching new lows, Kitchel, White 
and their team began to organize. The elaborate network is a testament to what White 
could have done had he been named campaign manager. In many respects, the 
Goldwater organization during the convention was the most impressive of the entire 
campaign, despite the inexperience of its members. Clif White wired his entire staff 
with a centralized walkie-talkie system, ensuring that tabs were kept on every 
delegate: where they went, who they spoke to and especially if Goldwater was at risk 
of losing their vote.33 Days before the convention opened at the Cow Palace in San 
Francisco, the Associated Press estimated Goldwater would have 710 delegate votes 
on the first ballot, a comfortable margin for the 655 needed for the nomination. 
Kitchel told reporters that the campaign was not worried about the threat of Scranton 	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or other liberal Republicans, saying his force could not “find any evidence” that 
Scranton was gaining ground.34 But twelve years earlier, as they well knew, Robert 
A. Taft had arrived with 603 delegates, one short of the number required for 
nomination, and lost ten days later on the first ballot.35 The Goldwater team was not 
about to relive that experience. 
Their work paid off. Columnist Max Freedman reminded onlookers that 
Goldwater was not on the cusp of clinching the nomination “merely by default.” The 
events leading to this moment proved quite the opposite actually. “It has been 
essentially a triumph of organization carried out against great odds,” Freedman 
continued. Compared at the time to John F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign for its savvy 
and skill, the Goldwater operation had reached its climax under White’s leadership, 
and Freedman observed the team clearly understood “the knowledge that a 
presidential campaign is never a splendid improvisation but is always a matter of 
supreme organization.”36 “In 1960 Robert F. Kennedy and his coworkers put together 
a remarkably effective organization for bird-dogging delegates,” wrote the Phoenix 
Gazette, “the Goldwater structure leaves much less to chance.”37 
 The victory was not only unexpected because of Goldwater’s political 
positions and style, but because of who he had chosen as his architects. Profiling the 
campaign structure, U.S. News and World Report referred to the effort as a purely 
grass-roots campaign. There is no doubt that without the collection of devoted 	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supporters, the organization could not have succeeded. “Bit by bit, precinct by 
precinct, the Senator solidified his pre-Convention support,” the profile read, “While 
others got the headlines, Goldwater got the delegates.”38 It appeared that no one could 
stop the determination of this rag-tag group of political neophytes. “With skill and 
unflagging determination, [the organization] was assembled by a blueprint defying 
the rules of the game of politics,” observed Marquis Childs, “If the organization the 
Goldwaterites have put together is not in fact a new political party, it is certainly a 
new kind of Republican Party.”39 “Barry Goldwater’s inner circle contains not a 
single well-known Republican politician,” wrote the Washington Post, “not a solitary 
old pro or young Turk of the type that have dominated Party planning and strategy for 
the last 20 years.” Describing White as “Goldwater’s principal political manager and 
author of strategy,” Burch as an “able Jack-of-all-trades,” and applauding Kitchel for 
what he accomplished despite his meager past experience, Evans and Novak saw the 
team’s success as nothing short of remarkable.40 Casting the Establishment as the true 
amateurs for their weak counter, David Lawrence wrote in his national column, 
“Amateurism lost to professionalism. Inexperience was beaten by experience. 
Maturity triumphed over immaturity.”41 It appeared that the peasants had dethroned 
the kings and crowned themselves. At this point, with the nomination sealed against 
great odds, the infant organization seemed to have worked. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “How Goldwater Got His Strength,” U.S. News and World Report, July 13, 1964, U57, National 
Newspapers July 13-15, 1964, Folder 9, Box 128, Goldwater Papers (ASU). 
39 Marquis Childs, “How Goldwater Conquered GOP,” Washington Post, July 13, 1964, A16, National 
Newspapers July 13-15, 1964, Folder 9, Box 128, Goldwater Papers (ASU).	  
40 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Barry’s Boys,” Washington Post, July 14, 1964, A15, National 
Newspapers July 13-15, 1964, Folder 9, Box 128, Goldwater Papers (ASU). 
41 David Lawrence, “Amateurs Lost to Professionals,” Arizona Newspapers July 16-17, 1964, Folder 
8, Box 127, Goldwater Papers (ASU). 
In Reckless Pursuit | 93	  	  
 	  
 Even more striking was the diverse group of individuals who had formed the 
grassroots Goldwater movement. “An intellectual with a keen rationalization of its 
political position finds himself bedded down with kooks” within the Goldwater tent, 
observed Richard Wilson. The loose coalition of supporters, ranging from party 
insiders to pedigreed intellectuals to rowdy grassroots activists, provided the 
backbone that had allowed White and Kitchel to craft a disciplined convention 
organization.42 “They’re well-to-do businessmen, new to politics,” declared the 
Washington Post, “who think moderates equal Democrats.”43 As Phillips-Fein notes, 
these activists were “not the all-knowing, all-seeing caricatures of conspiracy 
theory.”44  Disgusted with the national political trend, and tired of the “me-tooism” 
exhibited by the Republican establishment, these normally apolitical Americans had 
finally taken a stand, and had won. But while the kingmakers had been caught 
sleeping, due to either “unbelievable naïveté or shocking stupidity on the part of 
many more who failed dismally to appreciate the shift in political power,” they would 
not concede quietly.45 
* * * 
As he left the convention, Tom Wicker wrote in his column that Republican delegates 
must feel much as William Allen White had recalled feeling after the nomination of 
Warren G. Harding in 1920: “I was torn, as I often am in politics, between the desire 
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to dump into the fiery furnace as a martyr, and the instinct to save my hide and go 
along on the broad way that leadeth to destruction.”46 The 1964 delegates were torn 
between supporting the champion who had won the nomination, but could not win the 
general election, and a carbon cutout of rehashed traditionalism that may have a 
chance.  Before the delegates could return home though, they would be embroiled in 
four days of intense political drama. “Speeches, Speeches, Speeches,” is how the 
Associated Press summed up the days-long event. “Seconding speeches, speeches, 
speeches, can’t they be prosecuted for unlicensed distribution of tranquilizers?” the 
news wire joked.47 Every Republican luminary, from Margaret Chase Smith to Milton 
Eisenhower to George Romney, took the microphone to address the delegates. 
 The eminent Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois, who had 
aided Goldwater’s first campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1952, formally nominated his 
colleague on July 15. Dirksen described Goldwater as “the grandson of a peddler,” 
and added, “My appraisal or your appraisal of an individual must not be fragmented 
instead of thinking of the whole man impelled by conviction to do and to say at any 
given time what he believes must be said or done.” Dirksen compared Goldwater to 
the famous legends of the Senate—Webster, Calhoun, Clay, La Follette and Taft—for 
his “moral courage,” declaring, “Courage and conscience are a part of the whole 
man.” It was a noble attempt to disassociate Goldwater with his unpopular caricature 
as an extremist.48  
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The Senate Leader was followed by the irascible congresswoman from New 
York and two-time ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, who had assailed her own 
husband (the publisher of Time and Life) for the press’ unfair treatment of 
Goldwater.49 Actively considering a primary campaign against New York’s liberal 
Republican senator, Jacob Javits, Luce was representative of the rowdy faction 
embodied by Goldwater. In her seconding speech, Luce denounced the most recent 
polling with equal vehemence and announced that Goldwater’s nomination was “the 
moment of truth” for the Republican Party: 
What seems most conspicuous to me is that he abundantly possesses the three 
cardinal virtues we have traditionally expected in a responsible Republican 
leader: Political loyalty, political courage, and political faith.50 
 
The first evening of the convention, Governor Mark Hatfield, “a moderate 
Republican dove” and popular executive, presented the convention’s keynote 
address.51 The Oregon orator, although sympathetic to Rockefeller’s ideology, 
handled the issue of extremism diplomatically. With his primary criticism strongly 
and unquestionably directed at President Johnson and the Democratic administration, 
Hatfield hoped that whoever was nominated the following day would “have the 
support of a united Republican Party.” “We cannot afford the luxury of the 
handsitters in the parlor,” he reminded his divided peers, “We need laborers in the 
vineyard come November.” But then Hatfield came to the subject that was so 
obviously on the minds of convention delegates.  
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“There are bigots in this nation who spew forth their venom of hate,” he 
cautioned, “They parade under hundreds of labels, including the Communist party, 
the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society. They must be overcome.”52 Hatfield 
had not challenged the conservatives in his party, he had not denounced Goldwater, 
nor had he condemned the senator’s political philosophy. But he still sparked a 
contentious and divisive dialogue that would dominate the convention hall for the 
remainder of the week, indicative of the tension that hung over the proceedings. 
While Barry Goldwater had sent Hatfield a telegram that read, “Magnificent is the 
word for it. A great keynote speech,” other conservatives were less happy with the 
governor’s performance. Hatfield’s office was pummeled with “abusive mail and 
telegrams” for much of the week afterwards.53 “Gov. Hatfield’s linking of the John 
Birch Society with the Communists and the Ku Klux Klan, both declared subversive 
organizations is preposterous,” wrote Joseph Romer of Colma, California to William 
Miller, “I’m sickened by this obvious slander before millions of viewers.”54 E.J. 
Anderson of Chicago, Illinois wrote, “Will someone remind Gov. Mark Hatfield 
keynote speaker, that in his summary of bigots in this nation he overlooked the most 
dastardly of them all: The ‘Three Musketeers of Smear,’ Lodge, Scranton and 
Rockefeller.”55 So distraught were conservative observers that they treated Hatfield’s 
speech as a funeral. “Our deepest condolences and sympathy over the very 
unfortunate choice of the party for the convention keynote speaker,” telegrammed 
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Ray Wulfe of the Collin County (Texas) Executive Committee, “it is regrettable that 
Governor Hatfield displayed to the nation such obvious characteristics of the 
ritualistic and uninformed left wing extremist…better judgment next time.”56 There 
were strong contradictions even among those supportive of the nominee. While 
enthusiasts like Dirksen and Luce spoke in favor of the nominee-to-be and Hatfield 
attempted to unite a splintering party, none could cure the deep divides that persisted.  
Moreover, the most famous of the early speeches overshadowed them all, 
contributing to the palpable split. Nelson Rockefeller took the stage on July 14 to 
deliver his liberal swan song, proposing an amendment denouncing “extremism.” 
Bitter in defeat, the New York governor made one final effort, whether to save his 
party from what he perceived as ideological ruin or to ensure its total destruction. 
Rockefeller told a booing crowd, “These extremists feed on fear, hate and terror. 
They have no program for America—no program for the Republican Party,” clearly 
referring to the majority of delegates he addressed. Handing the press and the 
Democrats the lines that would be repeated throughout the fall campaign, Rockefeller 
caricatured Goldwater conservatism: “Whether Communist, Ku Klux Klan or 
Birchers. There is no place in this Republican Party for those who would infiltrate its 
ranks, distort its aims and convert it into a cloak of apparent respectability for a 
dangerous extremism.”57 With extremism now fully and completely synonymous with 
conservatism, and the rowdy response seemingly proving his case, Rockefeller vowed 
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to continue to fight against it, because, he said, “It has no place in the party. It has no 
place in America.”58 
 The ordeal encapsulated the entire conduct of the campaign from the earliest 
primary contests. The first concern of many of Goldwater’s handlers was not 
Rockefeller, but the identities of those who were berating him. Clif White 
immediately dispatched subordinates to stop the booing, but the staff quickly found 
that the hecklers were not Goldwaterites. They were strangers in the spectator 
galleries, not pledged delegates, and had not been given tickets by Goldwater’s 
campaign. While the Goldwater staffers begged them to stop, they refused. “In 
defying our orders,” White wrote, “they were obviously carrying out someone 
else’s.”59 Whether the hecklers were hired hands of Rockefeller himself, or out-of-
control zealots from the John Birch Society or Young Americans for Freedom, has 
never been discovered. Regardless, as historian Lee Edwards notes, “Rockefeller’s 
charade had little impact on the delegates, but it provided an indelible impression for 
TV viewers of conservatives as raving, ranting radicals and gave Democrats another 
part of their script for the anti-Goldwater campaign in the fall.”60 “Anyone in charge 
of order,” telegrammed an anonymous Republican as the convention organization 
collapsed over the next few days, “Can’t you quiet that horn. Horns belong in 
circuses.”61 
As the drama raged across town, the flaws in Goldwater’s personal approach 
might also have undermined unity. He took little interest in the showmanship of the 	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convention and spent much of his time in his hotel suite. Removed and isolated from 
all of it, Goldwater cured his restlessness by tinkering with portable shortwave radios. 
Press secretary Edward K. Nellor described Goldwater as “slightly bored” and the 
senator frequently canceled appointments, preferring to take photographs of the San 
Francisco skyline instead.62 It was behavior characteristic of the reluctance that 
Goldwater had demonstrated throughout the campaign. It had followed him through 
every step of the process: in the years where he grappled with the decision, when he 
considered dropping his campaign after his New Hampshire defeat, and as he dealt 
with the magnitude of receiving his party’s nomination. 
 On the evening of July 15, after all the speechmaking, the delegates began the 
intense work of actually voting for the nominee. It was a process that lasted a little 
more than six minutes. Goldwater received 883 votes on the first ballot, twice as 
many as the other candidates combined. It was an anticlimactic end to what had been 
a bitter, long race. The senator, who watched the votes come in from his suite with his 
brother and Denison Kitchen, called White and his staff to say thank you. As he 
finished, Kitchel interrupted him. Rockefeller was on the other line. “Hell, I don’t 
want to talk to that son-of-a-bitch,” Goldwater scoffed.63 With Goldwater’s 
nomination secured, Governor Scranton requested that the convention make it 
unanimous, delivering a gracious speech for party harmony. Goldwater quickly 
selected Congressman William Miller as his running mate, without consulting anyone 
outside of his inner circle, and the night ended.64  	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* * * 
The morning of Barry Goldwater’s acceptance speech, the Arizona Republic ran a 
Biblical excerpt from Romans 12:21 under the paper’s header: “Be not overcome of 
evil, but overcometh evil with good.”65 It was an omen of what the Arizonan had 
planned for that evening. Finally engaged, Goldwater devoted more attention and care 
to his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination than to any speech of his 
political career. In consultation with speechwriters Karl Hess, Bill Baroody and Harry 
Jaffa, Goldwater hoped to clearly articulate his conservative philosophy to a wider 
audience than he had ever addressed.  
Preparations for the speech began on July 11, only days before the convention 
opened, but the events of July 12 changed the close-knit staff’s thinking. Instead of 
the traditional theme of party unity, the timing of Scranton’s letter denouncing 
Goldwater convinced the senator and his advisors that this speech needed to be a 
declaration of a conservative takeover. It was a theme Hess had been working on 
throughout the campaign. Before the California primary, he had scribbled notes on his 
pad that would be reminiscent of the acceptance speech language: “Where is the 
Republican mainstream? Not with the spoilers—the rule or ruiners. They [are] a tiny 
fraction.”66 Goldwater later reflected that it appeared “politically illogical and 
personally contradictory” to “offer olive branches” to the Rockefeller faction of the 
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party. Rather, he preferred the greatest speech of his career to reflect the “historic 
break” as conservatives charted “a new course in GOP national politics.”67 
 In the final working draft, Baroody noted, “The convention speeches thus far 
get off the ground like a fuseless rocket—we must have them jumping in the first 
page.” Everyone agreed that the acceptance speech needed to be laced with intense 
passion and emotion. In the final draft, Baroody scrawled across the top, “More 
punch at beginning.” Despite that call for emotion, the staff was concerned about the 
intensity of a particular line and debated its potential impact on the convention: “I 
believe, however, that we must look beyond the defense of freedom today to its 
extension tomorrow. I believe that the Communism which boasts it will bury us will 
instead be buried by us.” Scribbled beside the paragraph were the words, “Too 
strong?” Hardly a controversial statement, the amateur team remained too 
preoccupied with lines like this to recognize the true shortcomings of the speech. The 
infamous line of the speech, “Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation 
in the pursuit of justice is no virtue,” was left untouched in the final revision. Baroody 
ended his note with an almost ironic phrase, “Pax vobiscum,” the Latin for “peace 
with you.”68 The fact that none of the speechwriters recognized that the word 
“extremism” had come to have a special meaning in the campaign is almost 
unbelievable.  
While the speechwriters ignored the buzzword “extremism,” they concluded 
that the speech as a whole “could be a bit more ‘gutsy.’”69 Their desire for the speech 	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to be more “gusty” might have been one reason for overlooking “extremism.” 
Another was that, articulated in the proper context, “extremism” could be fully 
explained, potentially dispelling the issue for the remainder of the campaign. Lee 
Edwards contends that Harry Jaffa, who penned the infamous phrase, had a clear 
rationale for doing so. Thomas Paine had written in 1791, “Moderation in temper is 
always virtue; but moderation in principle is always vice” and Martin Luther King, Jr. 
had written only one year earlier, “Nonviolent efforts as those of an extremist…Was 
not Jesus an extremist for love?...Was not Paul an extremist for the Christian 
Gospel?...So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of 
extremists we will be.”70 Historian Robert Alan Goldberg believes that Jaffa was 
inspired by Aristotle’s work, but adds that the statement “lacked either explanation or 
example.”71 Goldwater wrote that Jaffa had told him that similar words were first 
used by Cicero in defense of Catalina in the Roman Republic: “I must remind you—
Lords, Senators—that extreme patriotism in defense of freedom is no crime, and let 
me respectfully remind you that pusillanimity in the pursuit of justice is no virtue in a 
Roman.”72  
While this understanding of the term “extremism” is reasonable, the 
speechwriters never provided that context, therefore forcing listeners to define the 
word using the context readily provided by Rockefeller and his associates. Shadegg 
later claimed that while Jaffa had written the phrase for a Platform Committee plank, 
where a context would have been provided, he never intended it to be used in the 
acceptance speech. Despite being one of Goldwater’s chief speechwriters, it is not 	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farfetched to suggest that Jaffa was not part of a conversation about the line’s 
inclusion because he was not part of the campaign’s inner circle.73 All of that 
explanation though fails to elucidate what the Goldwater staff anticipated the reaction 
to the line might be. Goldwater himself did not believe the media or his critics would 
pay any attention to the phrase, which is why it was left intact while less obviously 
derisive phrases were underlined, edited and cut in the final draft of the speech. After 
a months-long debate circling the very word “extremism,” Goldwater and his team 
should have realized that the phrase would be poorly received, that it would confirm 
the negative portrayal of the nominee, and that it would further handicap an already 
disadvantaged campaign. 
“There’s an old saying you can win a battle and still lose a war,” Raymond L. 
Baker wrote to Bill Miller after the fallout from the speech.74 As Goldwater accepted 
his nomination with those infamous words, “Extremism in defense of liberty is no 
vice,” the issue immediately became a central theme of the general election. “My 
God, he’s going to run as Barry Goldwater,” one reporter is said to have gasped.75 
Clif White later recalled, “I was as stunned as anyone that night by the abrasive 
quality of his words.”76 “These words are almost certainly destined to become a major 
issue in the campaign,” wrote Mohr after the convention. 
Moreover, Goldwater’s choice of words simply drew more questions. In June, 
Goldwater had “defined extremism as Fascism and Communism,” so was he now 
endorsing these ideologies? In addition, the convention had just previously taken up 	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debate to condemn “extremist groups,” such as the John Birch Society and the Ku 
Klux Klan, forcing many to wonder if these were the extremists Goldwater was 
defending.77 “You said that you would not repudiate the support of the Ku Klux Klan. 
I do not understand this,” wrote Solomon Rosengarten of Brooklyn, New York a few 
weeks later, “How can you support an organization which is dedicated to the 
subversion of our constitutional government.”78 Adding to the criticism that 
Goldwater was sympathetic towards the Ku Klux Klan, he had mentioned the words 
“free,” “freedom,” and “liberty” forty times, but had not once mentioned “civil 
rights.” Emmet John Hughes of Newsweek even went so far as to refer to the Klan 
and Birchers as “lesser menaces” compared to the “enraged delegates” that supported 
Goldwater.79 The newly minted nominee provided few insights.  
Both Republicans and Democrats were critical in their post-convention 
reactions. Pat Brown, the Democratic governor of California, railed that “[the speech] 
was an open invitation to the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan,” declaring 
that the only thing missing was a “Heil Hitler” for the Jewish nominee.80 Dwight 
Eisenhower offered a lukewarm endorsement, saying, “I will do my best to support 
[the ticket]—although as I say it was not my personal choice.”81 The Washington Post 
implored that “Candidate Goldwater start over again and tell the people in carefully 
chosen words precisely what he does believe ‘extremism’ is and how it affects the 
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country’s constant search for freedom and justice.”82 The New Republic called 
Goldwater a “deviate Republican,” writing, “The Republican nominee for President is 
not the captive of the crackpots, but he is their candidate.”83 Senator Dirksen, a 
devoted Goldwater supporter, also suggested that clarification was needed, while 
Governor Rockefeller, who had since pledged to work on Goldwater’s behalf for 
party unity, “led off today with a sharp attack” against the nominee.84  
In response to the mounting criticism, Goldwater simply became angry. 
“Would the Governor fight for his life?” he railed, “That would be extreme action. Is 
it extreme action for our boys to give their lives in Viet-Nam?”85 On a separate 
occasion, the senator tried to laugh it off. “Some members of my own party seem to 
have their own version of that quote, like: ‘Extremism in defense of moderation is no 
vice, moderation in pursuit of Goldwater is no virtue,’” he joked.86 These types of 
responses were hardly the well-reasoned clarification many expected. Not only had 
the Goldwater staff failed to anticipate the impact of the line, but they had also failed 
to effectively handle the sudden fallout. The mismanagement went beyond poor 
political skills and seemed a failure of basic political common sense. 
Bill Miller, the vice-presidential nominee selected only days before, attempted 
to control the uproar as Goldwater “backstroked through waves of applause and 
disappeared,” a testament to his overall reluctance and his desire to simply escape the 
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national pressures. Miller, who served simultaneously as a New York congressman 
and chairman of the Republican National Committee, was both a respected 
establishment insider and an unabashed conservative in the Goldwater mold. 
“Heartiest congratulations,” William Loeb of the Manchester-Union Leader wrote to 
Miller, “this should be a winning team.”87 Supporters told Miller he handled the press 
“like a Master, which you no doubt are” and expressed a great relief that a trusted 
professional would be part of the Goldwater team.88 “Having observed over a period 
of time your voting record, your skillful leadership as Chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, and your public performance,” wrote Sam. V. Claiborne, state 
chairman of the Tennessee Republican Party, “I have come to have an extremely high 
regard for your leadership qualities.”89 
The Wall Street Journal described him as “a rapier-tongued ex-district 
attorney with a reputation for getting his man,” capable of heating up the dormant 
race.90 Ironically, Miller had also been a Nuremberg prosecutor of the very Nazis his 
running mate was now compared to. “I know something about the rise of Hitler to 
power in Germany,” the vice presidential nominee would remind audiences who 
charged Goldwater with fascism.91  But even Miller struggled to contextualize 
Goldwater’s remarks. “Well…you first have to understand what the senator means by 
extremism,” Miller calmly explained, “extremism is significant and praiseworthy in 
things for which we feel deeply. I, uh, hope my wife loves me…I hope my wife loves 	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me extremely.”92 It would not be until August that Goldwater finally rejected the 
fringe groups he had become associated with, stating, “We repudiate character 
assassins, vigilantes, Communists, and any other group, such as the Ku Klux Klan 
that seeks to impose its views through terror.”93  
It was not the conservative message that was too extreme, but the messenger 
that was too untamed. By the time Goldwater had repudiated “extremists,” the 
damage had been done, ruining the nominee’s already fragile reputation. The ill-
advised acceptance speech, fueled by momentary passion and ignorant of rational 
considerations, marked the end of any realistic hope for a Truman-style comeback. 
“The reason why so many Republicans now tell pollsters they prefer President 
Johnson to Goldwater is not the Senator’s conservatism,” wrote Evans and Novak, 
“the vague fear that he will provoke nuclear holocaust is what really frightens” 
voters.94 Polls conducted for the Goldwater campaign by Thomas W. Benham, vice 
president of the Opinion Research Corporation, showed that post-election, 47 percent 
of voters believed Goldwater’s dominant quality was that he would “act without 
thinking.” Additionally, 29 percent viewed his political philosophy not as 
“conservative,” but as “radical” and 44 percent believed the threat of nuclear war was 
greater under Goldwater than Johnson.95  
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As Benham notes, these were all issues Goldwater and his staff failed to deal 
with, plaguing his campaign. Stephen Shadegg argued that the acceptance speech 
shed light on the inability of Goldwater’s managers, “The manner in which the 
acceptance speech was written became the pattern of the Goldwater statements during 
the campaign—ideas and phrases gathered together…until all unity and style was 
completely destroyed.”96 There was no thinking, no planning and no rationality. 
Political science professor Bernard K. Johnpoll of Hartwick College in Oneonta, New 
York, told local reporters the best Republicans could hope for was a quick and silent 
loss, adding “We certainly have more sanity in an Ostego county cow pasture than I 
saw in the San Francisco Cow Palace.”97 “The 1964 Republican Convention climaxes 
a century of fascism and stupidity,” argued Gerald M. Capers, chairman of the 
History Department at Tulane University, “it is sad to witness the disintegration of a 
great party.”98  
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V. SPIRALING TOWARDS THE FINISH 
 
 
The damaging events of the convention followed the campaign as it barreled 
through the summer, and Goldwater’s team continued to demonstrate panache for 
poor planning and questionable staffing decisions. Continuing to ignore the grassroots 
activists and White’s well-run convention organization, Goldwater chose to run his 
campaign through the Republican National Committee, an unusual step in and of 
itself. Moreover, Goldwater began to fill the central body with his loyalists.1 Passing 
over the more experienced Clif White as chairman of the RNC, who believed he had 
earned the job, Goldwater selected the 36-year old novice, Dean Burch.2 Goldwater’s 
selection was more to purge Republican defectors than strengthen the party. 
“Goldwater men came to monopolize key spots in the national organization” and 
seemed “more interested in ousting moderates from the GOP hierarchy than in 
ousting LBJ from the White House.”3 “The old organization is scarcely recognizable 
except for its name,” reported the New York Times.4 Among the casualties were party 
veterans like William B. Prendergast, who had authored party platforms in four 
presidential elections, and other skilled operatives of the Eastern Establishment. 
Powerful New York was unrepresented in the RNC for the first time in history.5 
Writing to Chairman Burch on the removal of many long-time committeemen, Mrs. 	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Elbert Stellmon, an Idaho delegate, remarked, “It makes many voters wonder if the 
news media is not correct in stating that your organization is more dedicated to 
obtaining control of the Republican Party than it is in electing Senator Goldwater as 
President of these United States in 1964.”6  
Exiled once again by the Arizona Mafia, White was appointed director of the 
second-tier campaign arm, Citizens for Goldwater-Miller, obviously a more minor 
role than he deserved.7 “Well, I guess my job is done,” White said as he departed the 
campaign he had dedicated his life to for three years.8 Vice presidential nominee Bill 
Miller, although considered a “startling vice-presidential choice” because of his 
geographic location and poor name recognition, was largely seen as someone who 
could handle the “trouble” Goldwater would inevitably cause. “Miller talks well and 
hits hard,” Roger Kahn reported.9 But, like White, Miller was pushed out by the 
nominee’s inner circle. The would-be vice president quickly came to the conclusion 
that “the most sensible thing he could do was to enjoy himself,” and while he 
maintained a busy campaign schedule, his personal plane soon became an oasis of 
booze and gambling.10 
Without the triumph of the nomination to shield its inefficiencies, the 
organization’s true form became obvious. The Goldwater team remained fractured 
throughout the general election. The Saturday Evening Post wrote that the image of 	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the Goldwater campaign as a “superorganized and rigidly disciplined army of 
dedicated conservatives” that had been praised only months before was nothing more 
than a myth. It continued, “Goldwater’s political apparatus is perhaps the least 
disciplined and least monolithic put together by any presidential nominee in this 
century.”11 In October, Time added that there had been no effort over the past month 
that seemed “calculated to win to his cause any sizeable new segments of voters.”12 
Goldwater’s organization was far from the terror envisioned by liberals at the start of 
the campaign. Congressman John Ashbrook, one of the original members of White’s 
Chicago meeting, joked, “I get a kick out of all this praise heaped on us. The only 
reason we came out all right is the people at the grass roots.” In other words, the 
impressive organization applauded by the media, while skillful at the convention, was 
an overall fantasy.  
Those enthusiastic efforts had been largely exhausted by the fall. Benham 
notes that many Goldwater workers were “infected with ‘defeatism.’” In October, 46 
percent of Goldwater supporters believed Johnson would win the election, compared 
with only 37 percent who believed their candidate would win. Although the most 
devout loyalists were still active, their efforts were in vain. While Republican 
campaign workers contacted 7.1 million households compared to only 3.8 million by 
Democrats, a reverse from numbers in 1960, there was little direction or focus to this 
campaign outreach.13 This was simply the “Goldwater myth,” Novak contended, “The 
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confusion, the indecision, and the blunders that are inherent in political-campaign 
organizations were to be found in abundance within the Goldwater organization.”14 
Moreover, the Republican regulars had all but abandoned their nominee. 
While Goldwater and Miller maintained bruising schedules, making two dozen trips 
to California alone in a single month, other Republican notables barely campaigned. 
Richard Nixon, ever the party loyalist and most likely already plotting his own 1968 
campaign, made the greatest effort of the party leaders. But Nixon did not begin 
actively campaigning nationwide until mid-October. William Scranton made several 
appearances on behalf of the campaign throughout September, but suspended his 
efforts in early October, a full month before Election Day. Perhaps even more 
revealing, Scranton did not make a single campaign speech in his home state of 
Pennsylvania, a battleground crucial for victory. Finally, despite being listed on the 
official campaign schedule, President Eisenhower made zero appearances on behalf 
of Goldwater, the most potent evidence of his dislike for the nominee.15 
While the poor organization was deserving of criticism, the nominee himself 
received most of the blame due to his personal style, which observers related to his 
conservative ideology. The New York Times forever wedded personality to beliefs in 
its harsh article focused on Goldwater being both “uniquely individualistic” and 
“contradictory.” “Mr. Goldwater is not the spokesman of a broadly understood 
general philosophy,” wrote Mohr, “as much as he is the prophet of a uniquely 
individualistic structure of his own gospel.”16 Criticized for lacking an “orderly mind” 	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and displaying “mercurial changes in his behavior,” as evidenced by his changing 
attitudes towards actively campaign, the senator often confused the press and the 
public with mood swings that appeared as changes in ideological views. An 
additional problem caused by Goldwater’s personality was his refusal to seek outside 
advice from long-time strategists, many of whom had been purged by Dean Burch. 
The New York Times observed, “Mr. Goldwater is not a man who can work easily 
with men he does not know intimately, who do not completely subscribe to his 
conservative views, and whose personal loyalties, because of past service on behalf of 
the moderate wing of the party, may be less than single-minded and whole-hearted.”17 
Of course, that insulated campaign staff was also to blame for these shifting stances. 
“Beneath a façade of monolithic unity,” wrote the Los Angeles Times, “Barry 
Goldwater’s camp is bitterly split over basic tactics.”18 As late as October, the 
campaign staff was still unable to unite. Some believed that the candidate should 
change his style and content, while others viewed such action as denouncing 
principle, believing only an “unforeseeable break” could lead to victory. Facing a 
widening poll difference, the New York Times reported, “Mr. Goldwater’s advisers 
are not in agreement as to how to close the gap.”19 
In the wake of mounting negative coverage, the campaign staff remained 
divided. The issue most devastating to Goldwater was his statements on the use of 
nuclear weapons; here the tightly controlled message from the spring was quickly 
lost. In September, Senator Goldwater was said to believe that “military field 	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commanders already have the power, without specific Presidential order, to use 
nuclear weapons,” a resurrection of his gaffe from months earlier.20 The staff 
response simply prolonged the issue. “The most notable divergence of opinion in the 
Goldwater camp is over the nuclear issue,” wrote the New York Times. Some advisors 
believed the senator should “continue to hammer out a hard line of nuclear 
preparedness,” while others urged a return to a program of “domestic 
conservatism.”21  As the story broke, Novak wrote, “Far worse than the danger of 
confusing voters is the disaster of frightening them.”22 Further, pressed in October on 
whether or not he actually believed military commanders had nuclear authority, “no 
direct answer was forthcoming.”23 The poor handling of the situation was never 
corrected. On October 23, only ten days before the election, the image of Goldwater 
as literally a loose canon was evocative. “Mr. Goldwater’s efforts to alter his 
reputation for irresponsibility with nuclear weapons has had limited success,” noted 
Donald Janson.24 
Instead, Goldwater tried to resort to his earlier strategy of generalities. From 
the very beginning of his presidential campaign, the mixture of blunt statements 
backed by vague policy prescriptions had confused and unnerved onlookers. Charles 
Mohr called it “a fetish of frankness,” noting that the senator’s “frankness often 
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leaves uncertainty.”25 In being frank, Goldwater believed he was being honest, but on 
a national stage frankness was synonymous with ambiguity, uncertainty and 
hesitation. The honesty was simply lost in the bluntness and the combination of the 
two made him appear reckless. Equally detrimental was Goldwater’s tone-deaf 
messaging. Campaign correspondence show that the staff was well aware of the 
problem, but could not correct it. A memorandum in September on Goldwater’s trip 
through the South noted, “he talks foreign aid to farmers, and agriculture to bankers.” 
One Southerner warned the campaign, “The Senator isn’t grouping his shots.” The St. 
Petersburg Times appropriately summed up the situation with the headline, “Right 
City, Wrong Speech.” “The St. Petersburg-Tampa area has the largest Social Security 
population in the Nation. What better place to clarify the Senator’s views on this 
subject?” wrote a Southern campaign hand, “instead, the subject was law and order—
and in a city where racial harmony does exist, and where there is little crime.”26 
Additionally, Benham reported in 1965 that, according to his polling data, the public 
never noticed Goldwater’s grand ideological debate. “If this election was a test of the 
liberal versus conservative political philosophies,” Benham observed, “many voters 
did not know it.”27 “With the exception of one speech on defense and some proposals 
on taxes,” wrote the Wall Street Journal, “[Goldwater] hasn’t dealt with the specific 
questions with answers making clear the choices as he sees them.”28  
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Goldwater had always hoped that his campaign would “amount to a broad 
debate of liberalism versus conservatism, a clear clash of philosophies,” like the one 
he had envisioned against Kennedy. With this grander hope in mind, he refused to 
wallow in the “pet issues” of local constituencies.29 Mrs. Edgar L. Morris, national 
committeewoman for South Carolina, noted in 1965 that this was among the 
campaign’s chief failings. “Since we are seeking votes,” she wrote to Goldwater, “the 
individual voter, his city, his section and his State must feel an identity with the 
candidate and his views.”30  
The weak strategy Goldwater adopted had failed largely due to his 
organization. Attempting to focus the campaign on the larger philosophical narrative 
of “moral decay” in America, Goldwater’s staff began production of a half-hour film 
titled “Choice.”31 With Clif White as the film’s technician, many within the campaign 
assumed it would be a strong presentation of the senator’s philosophical views. With 
production held entirely within the Citizens for Goldwater-Miller Committee, none of 
Goldwater’s policy advisers from his campaign or the RNC were involved in the 
project, demonstrating another instance of weak communication that could have 
potentially softened the film’s message. Whether due to White’s isolation or 
exhaustion with the internal campaign barriers, the film was an outlier in his 
otherwise flawless strategizing. While it was set to broadcast on October 22, networks 
refused to air it “objecting to the shots of seminudity and topless women,” and 
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Goldwater himself ordered that it be suspended.32 Referring to his own political 
commercial, Goldwater told the press, “It is not salacious. It is racist.”33 The 
campaign had even failed in laying out Goldwater’s philosophical values, an aspect of 
the campaign he had truly hoped to articulate. When Goldwater had announced his 
candidacy back in January 1964, he said, “I have been spelling out my positions now 
for 10 years in the Senate and for years before that here in my own state. I will spell it 
out even further in the months to come.”34 But that did not happen. While few other 
politicians had made more speeches, written more books or newspaper columns, or 
been more direct, few were as misunderstood as Barry Goldwater.  
Part of the blame for that misunderstanding is clearly and unquestionably due 
to the press coverage. “Fear of a Goldwater presidency among the media elite was a 
potent and growing force in the summer and fall of 1964,” wrote historian Robert 
Mann.35 As early as the New Hampshire primary, Goldwater and his staff had been 
unprepared for the national press and had poorly managed that important relationship. 
“I’ve often said that if I hadn’t known Barry Goldwater in 1964,” Goldwater himself 
reflected, “and I had to depend on the press and the cartoons, I’d have voted against 
the son of a bitch.”36 On July 8, Clare Boothe Luce accused the press of being 
“brutally unfair” to Senator Goldwater, and while she acknowledged victory could be 
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achieved, she noted that the coverage clearly ensured the odds favor Mr. Johnson.37 
Max Freedman agreed:  
The exact nature of Senator Goldwater’s objection [over unfair press 
treatment]…is not indulging in the usual political complaint that he has been 
misquoted or misrepresented. He is saying that he has suffered sustained 
personal attack that has sought to humiliate and discredit him as totally unfit 
for presidential consideration, a relic in his own party and a menace to the 
country. 
 
The columnist added that the “bitterness and venom” even surpassed “the personal 
abuse heaped on Richard Nixon over the years.”38 The Arizona Republic decried the 
blatant political agenda of the Saturday Evening Post, which had once lauded 
Goldwater during his 1958 reelection campaign. In October, the Post wrote that 
Goldwater was “manifestly unqualified to be president,” calling the senator “a 
grotesque burlesque of the conservative he pretends to be.” “He is a wild man, a stray, 
an unprincipled and ruthless political jujitsu artist,” the scathing column continued.39 
Christian Century charged that the Goldwater campaign was “indicative of the Nazi 
rise to power in 1933.”40 
 The most egregious abuse of press coverage though was surely Fact 
Magazine’s “The Unconscious of a Conservative: A Special Issue on the Mind of 
Barry Goldwater.” Surveying psychiatrists from across the country in an unscientific 
poll, the magazine concluded that Goldwater was mentally unfit to be president. 
“B.G. is in my opinion emotionally unstable, immature, volatile, unpredictable, 
hostile, and mentally unbalanced,” read the outside back cover, supposedly quoting a 	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respondent. Other “medical” opinions from within the article included, “Goldwater is 
a man of low character, a coward, weak, insecure, confused, with no constructive 
social program and no understanding of the needs of mankind,” and “He consciously 
wants to destroy the world with atomic bombs.” Dr. Walter E. Barton, Medical 
Director of the American Psychiatric Association, implored Fact to abandon the 
article. “A physician renders an opinion on the psychological fitness or mental 
condition of anyone…based upon a thorough clinical examination,” Dr. Barton wrote, 
“Being aware of this, should you decide to publish the results of a purported ‘survey’ 
of psychiatric opinion on the question you have posed, this Association will take all 
possible measures to disavow its validity.”41 The magazine published the survey 
anyway and Goldwater won a defamation lawsuit against it in 1968—long after the 
election was over. 
* * * 
On the other side of the political spectrum, Lyndon Baines Johnson held all the 
advantages a candidate could hope to have. “There was no way in the world that any 
Republican could have defeated Lyndon Johnson in 1964,” Goldwater wrote to 
Mitchell Altschuler, a Bronx admirer, in 1971.42 Campaigning on the Kennedy 
legacy, presiding over the height of post-war prosperity, and rehashing charges 
invented by Nelson Rockefeller, the Johnson campaign had every asset it needed. In 
fact, the old charges against Goldwater appeared with such frequency that one has to 
wonder if it was Rockefeller, not Hubert Humphrey, who was Johnson’s most 
valuable running mate. Asked by U.S. News and World Report after the election if he 	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thought Governors Rockefeller and Scranton were partly responsible for his defeat, 
Goldwater responded, “Frankly, I think I was beaten on July 15 [1964],” the day 
following Rockefeller’s convention performance and the day of his own poorly 
received speech.43 
 The most recycled issue of the general election was, unsurprisingly, 
Goldwater’s stance on nuclear weapons. In a Johnson-Humphrey campaign pamphlet, 
“100 Million Lives in One Hour,” the campaign asked, “Which candidate do you trust 
to secure peace?” It continued to describe Goldwater as an advocate of nuclear 
weapons who “speaks often of war, rarely of peace. He has indicated he would 
recklessly risk war in Cuba, in Viet Nam, in China, in Eastern Europe.”44 As early as 
July 1964, Johnson had decided to center the fall campaign on the issue of nuclear 
weapons, as well as Goldwater’s self-destructive personality. “What we need to get in 
on is [Goldwater’s] impetuousness and his impulsiveness,” the president told his 
closest advisers.45 The president referred to Goldwater as “the new and frightening 
voice of the Republican Party,” arguing that some of Goldwater’s positions were “the 
product of some third-string speech writer.”46 
 Johnson’s most blunt attempt to connect his opponent to nuclear war was his 
campaign’s infamous “Daisy” commercial. Airing only once, on Labor Day 1964, the 
ad depicting a little girl in a field of flowers annihilated by a mushroom cloud 
explosion has become one of the most iconic political ads of the twentieth century. 	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Dean Burch filed a formal complaint with the Fair Campaign Practices Committee 
less than a week later, arguing, “This horror-type commercial is designed to arouse 
basic emotions and has no place in this campaign.”47 In his memoirs, Goldwater 
noted, “The commercials completely misrepresented my positions,” calling the Daisy 
ad, and its sequel commercial that aired on September 12, “the start of dirty political 
ads on television.”48 
The dirty politicking of the Johnson campaign was enormous. Pat Axtell, a 
high-school student living in Colorado, wrote a school paper, “Why I’m for 
Goldwater,” largely on the basis that, unlike Johnson, Goldwater was honest, a 
worthy characteristic that had often led to misunderstanding during the campaign. 
Speaking on Johnson, she wrote: 
In Washington he was for more power in the central government while in 
Texas he was pushing states rights. In Washington he was for desegregation 
but in Texas he promised to protect schools from this. In Washington he was 
for Medicare, in Texas he was against it. This is an example of saying things 
just to get elected. Goldwater doesn’t do this.49 
 
Pat received an “A” on her paper, but the facts concerned neither President Johnson 
nor the electorate. As Johnson biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin noted, haunted by 
the paltry margin of 87 votes from his first campaign for the U.S. Senate and the 
feeling of illegitimacy constantly cast on him by the Kennedys, Johnson did not 
simply want to win, he wanted “the largest landslide in history.”50 And he was going 
to exploit every Goldwater weakness to achieve that. Moreover, despite the lack of a 
principled debate of political philosophies in the election, the differences between the 	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48 Barry M. Goldwater with Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 199.	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50 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 206.  
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candidates were stark, even in the most personal and ideological senses. As Edwards 
noted, Goldwater’s favorite president was Jefferson and Johnson’s was FDR, 
distinguishing the great divides in their political ideologies. Goldwater revered the 
philosophy of Hayek, while Johnson preferred that of Machiavelli. And while 
Goldwater was content to enjoy the company of close friends, Johnson yearned to be 
loved by the masses.51 Despite his efforts and convictions, Goldwater simply did not 
want the presidency as Johnson did, and clearly did not need it as badly. 
 Despite these insurmountable odds, and with a divided staff, Barry Goldwater 
campaigned throughout the general election with great energy and optimism. Even in 
the face of an August 9 Gallup poll showing Johnson with 64 percent to Goldwater’s 
36 percent, the senator showed no signs of defeatism.52 As early as the writing of his 
acceptance, when the polls were much the same, Goldwater had told his group, “I 
shouldn’t be writing an acceptance speech, I should be writing a speech telling them 
to look for someone else.”53 But many rank-and-file Republicans did not want 
someone else and many of his supporters still eagerly held out hope for an upset.  
* * * 
Historian Richard Hofstadter commented in October, “If the polls are approximately 
right, as I believe they are, Goldwater starts his campaign far behind, and stands in 
danger of being remembered as the Republican who lost Vermont.”54 
Despite the odds, Goldwater supporters, while dwindling in number, were growing in 
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intensity. U.S. News & World Report wrote on August 3, “At the grassroots, 
politicians are not taking Johnson’s election for granted. They think Goldwater is 
behind but could catch up.”55 The campaign itself was buoyed with optimism almost 
to the point of fantasy. Goldwater’s strategists had predicted in June that their 
candidate would carry 27 states with 278 electoral votes, including California, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio and Florida.56 Despite the wholly unrealistic prediction, campaign 
aides repeated it often, as if that would make it a reality. RNC Chairman Dean Burch 
told a Phoenix crowd in late October that Goldwater would carry 20 states with 261 
electoral votes, with three toss-up states casting the deciding ballots. “They have the 
polls, the columnists, and some businessmen,” Burch assured the party, “but we have 
the people and that’s what counts in an election.”57 During an interview in Reno, 
Nevada on October 1, Bill Miller told reporters that while “we, of course, started as 
underdogs…I think now we are getting our message over.” “I simply say that in the 
first place the polls were wrong,” the vice presidential nominee continued, referring 
to primary polling in New Hampshire, Oregon and California, “There is something in 
the wind in the United States that [pollsters] just can’t put their finger on.”58 On 
October 31, Goldwater was willing to concede only five states: Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, Alaska and Hawaii.59  
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Had the campaign been more focused, and the organization more disciplined, 
Goldwater should have been competitive in the traditionally Republican Midwest, as 
well as the West Coast and Florida. In 1960, Richard Nixon had carried Colorado, 
Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, Ohio, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming by at 
least 53 percent.  In 1964, Goldwater did not break 45 percent in any of these states. 
Furthermore, the states Nixon carried, where Republicans were traditionally strong, 
represented 177 electoral votes. Had Goldwater been able to carry them, as he should 
have been, he still would not have won the presidency, but he would have received 
229 electoral votes, as compared to the 52 he ultimately won.60 
A true case study of Goldwater’s weakness in traditionally Republican 
strongholds was his performance in Idaho. In 1960, Nixon carried Idaho with 54 
percent (the same percent Republican Robert Smylie received for the governorship in 
1962), but Goldwater received only 49 percent four years later. In a profile of the 
election in the state, Herbert Syndey Duncombe, a political scientist at the University 
of Idaho, wrote that despite Goldwater being supported by a majority of state 
newspapers, Idaho voters were not satisfied with Goldwater as a candidate. The 
Eastern Idaho Farmer, a member of the Idaho Press Association, had written that 
Goldwater represented “a political revolution in the United States” symbolizing “the 
only personality who could appeal to that great block of American citizens who have 
been so long—and are today more than ever—concerned with centralization of 
government in Washington.” That great block of Americans never materialized 
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though and even Idaho voters did not agree with the paper’s endorsement.61 Idaho 
seemed to follow the national trend. 
A poll conducted of previous Nixon voters who switched affiliations and 
voted for Johnson showed the defectors to be “younger, less wealthy, and more likely 
to consider nuclear policy and civil rights as the most important election issues.”62 
Goldwater also failed among socio-economic groups that traditionally voted 
Republican, capturing only 40 percent among men, 41 percent among whites, 46 
percent of those whose careers were defined as “professional and business,” and 41 
percent among voters over 60 (43 percent of whom believed Goldwater was opposed 
to Social Security).63 Clearly, the caricature of Goldwater’s positions, and his 
campaign’s inability to clarify his stances, cost him even within traditionally 
conservative voting blocks that would have otherwise been responsive to his message 
of limited government.  In fact, John O. McMurray, chairman of the Idaho 
Republican Party, called that caricature “the great tragedy” of the election. “The 
public image which was deliberately made by the enemy,” McMurray told 
Goldwater, “was just the opposite of the kind of person that I, and thousands of 
others, know you to be.”64 
In later years, Goldwater confessed that he never truly thought he could win 
the presidency, but during the campaign he was never infected by the defeatism that 
plagued some of his fellow Republicans. Goldwater remained dedicated to using his 
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platform to espouse the values of conservatism, and his great enthusiasm was well 
received by supporters. An October 5 campaign survey noted that while 83 percent of 
those planning to vote for Johnson described themselves as “strongly committed,” an 
astounding 91 percent of Goldwater voters said the same for their candidate.65 The 
nominee continued to laugh and joke, using such one-liners as, “Johnson is the only 
one who’d ever ask Krushchev for the name of his tailor” and “If this keeps up, the 
Democrats can put on their own TV show: Two Face the Nation.”66 His crowds were 
equally jovial. 
 In September, a crowd in Columbia, South Carolina was estimated to reach 
50,000 and in Atlanta, Georgia the campaign bragged that nearly 200,000 had come 
to see Goldwater.67 Even in arch-liberal New York City, 18,000 people attended 
Goldwater’s speech at Madison Square Garden on October 26, and the candidate was 
given a 28-minute ovation. Goldwater told the cheering crowd that the election would 
be “the major political upset of the century.”68  
While he would go down in tremendous defeat a week later, carrying only six 
states, there is no doubt that Goldwater still inspired conservative adherents. “I’m not 
old enough to vote,” eleven-year-old Judy Becker of Albany, New York wrote to the 
senator in a handmade scrapbook she compiled for him, “but three people in my 
family are. You have 2 of these votes and two out of three isn’t bad.”69 “Because of 
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your role in re-shaping the political climate in America,” wrote Samuel Ryder of 
Massachusetts, “I have great admiration for you and what you stand for.”70 Alex 
Weeder, junior class president at Caldwell High in Kansas, invited Goldwater to 
speak at the Junior-Senior Prom, writing, “I feel our class would enjoy listening to 
you and what you say.”71 Drake Edens, state chairman of the South Carolina 
Republican Party, urged Goldwater to move to his state to run for governor in 1966. 
“Steam is really beginning to build for you,” Edens assured him.72 In the midst of his 
own gubernatorial campaign in 1966, Ronald Reagan thanked Goldwater for paving 
the way. “You set the pattern and perhaps it was your fate to just be a little too soon,” 
Reagan said, “Or maybe it required someone with the courage to do what you did 
with regard to campaigning on principles.”73  
Writing to his supporters after the election, Goldwater reflected on his 
campaign. “I am convinced that the hard-rock core of 27,000,000 Americans will 
command a world of respect by the opposition,” he said, “To me, that’s a good 
start.”74 Loyal supporters and conservative activists had toiled beside him, and his 
defeat was theirs as well. “I suffered morally, mentally, and even financially,” wrote 
Mrs. Bernard Coley of Butler, New Jersey after the election loss, “my four year old 
daughter leaned over to me and whispered in my ear, ‘Mother, did Goldwater die.’”75 
Still, others were energized for the next election, including Evans R. Dick of Beverly 
Farms, Massachusetts. “Yes—we are extremists,” Dick wrote Goldwater, “and proud 
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of it.”76 Asked a decade later if he would have changed any part of his campaign, 
Goldwater said no, but would he ever want the chance? “I will not try for the 
Presidency ever again,” he wrote to a Mesa resident in 1972, “I am too happy where I 
am.”77 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The story of the 1964 Goldwater campaign is one of the greatest stories of 
twentieth century political history. It is a narrative of the sudden rise of a popular, 
independent warrior coupled with an equally sudden and tragic fall from grace. 
Surrounded by a cast described by historians as Machiavellian, it was also 
Shakespearean.1 With larger-than-life personalities dominating the political stage, the 
Goldwater candidacy provides a tremendous contrast in appearance versus reality, 
seen most clearly in the philosophy the candidate championed versus its extremist 
portrayal. Equally thematic is the Goldwater campaign apparatus, portrayed early in 
the campaign as an efficient machine capable of great triumph when in reality it was 
nothing more than a loose collaboration of political amateurs. Half a century after the 
campaign though, it remains one of the most fascinating in American history and 
continues to provide important insights into the roles of ideology and organization in 
modern politics. 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1964 defeat, the organization and the 
inexperience of its staff was rarely blamed, despite it bearing the bulk of 
responsibility. In December 1964, Goldwater wrote to every member of the 
Republican National Committee to ask what each believed went wrong a month 
earlier, and loyalists curtly condemned their bitter intraparty rivals. Joseph L. Budd, 
member for Wyoming, blamed Republican liberals, writing, “The elements of fear, 
which wouldn’t have been there if they hadn’t arisen in the Primary and at 
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Convention, were the ones that did you the most damage.”2 Charles Chapman, 
member for Alabama, agreed. “The issues your opponents in the primary raised 
concerning the nuclear issue and social security were extremely damaging as far as 
the general election was concerned,” he reflected, “All Johnson-Humphrey had to do 
was quote your opponents.” Chapman further argued that Nelson Rockefeller had 
ruined Richard Nixon’s chances in 1960 and was determined to do the same to 
Goldwater once Rockefeller’s own chances at the nomination were squandered.3 Ohio 
committeewoman Katharine Kennedy Brown told the Dayton Daily News, “Leading 
Republican ‘kingmakers’…went out to destroy the man their party had chosen.”4 And 
it was not only party insiders who felt that way. Louise Hartman, a resident of 
Arizona, wrote a “belated letter of thanks” to Goldwater for his “valiant effort…to 
give America back to the people.” “If Rockefeller, Romney or Scranton ever had the 
audacity to win the Republican nomination,” she blasted, “none of us would vote for 
President.”5 
The lack of party unity had played an important role in the 1964 Republican 
defeat, but it was hardly the only factor. Moreover, the ideological differences that led 
to that strife was not solely to blame either. It is unlikely that any Republican could 
have defeated Lyndon Johnson in 1964, a year representative of the apex of 
liberalism. For decades the legacy of the New Deal had defined postwar America, 
affecting the dynamics of both political parties and exposing the merits of activist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Joseph L. Budd to Goldwater, December 28, 1965, Reel 1, Barry Goldwater Papers, #2616, Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
3 Charles Chapamn to Goldwater, December 29, 1964, Reel 1, Goldwater Papers (Cornell). 
4 Doug Walker, “‘Big Lie Beat Barry,’ Mrs. Brown Claims,” Daily News (Dayton, OH), Reel 1, 
Goldwater Papers (Cornell). 
5 Louise B. Hartman to Goldwater, January 12, 1965, Reel 1, Goldwater Papers (Cornell).	  	  
In Reckless Pursuit | 131	  	  
 	  
government. With the Kennedy legacy an ever-present reminder of both the triumphs 
of liberalism and the dangers of the era, it would have been difficult for any 
Republican to challenge Johnson in 1964. Ironically, though, it is this period of 
liberalism that gave birth to the conservative tide, which was responsible for the 
nomination of Barry Goldwater. Like a volcano, which broods for decades, the 
conservative movement had been dormant, slowly building a coalition until suddenly 
erupting onto the national scene. That wellspring of conviction should have made a 
Republican candidate more competitive in 1964—unless that candidate was Barry 
Goldwater. 
For all his past campaign successes, Goldwater was ill-prepared for the 
national undertaking. Especially in the context of the slowly shifting political 
environment in which he operated, Goldwater was certainly more conservative than 
any other national figure. His ideology harshly challenged the reality that many 
Americans had grown accustomed to and seemed to threaten the system that granted 
those Americans greater security. Goldwater’s attempt to modernize the Social 
Security system, while necessary in retrospect, was premature, as was his hard-line on 
the growing threats of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The policies he 
espoused in 1964 were not seriously considered until the 1980s, and we continue to 
deal with many of the same issues Goldwater attempted to discuss fifty years ago. 
Goldwater was largely a figure before his time, arguing for rapid solutions to 
problems that were still being slowly digested. 
Even still, there would have been a groundswell of support for a well-
articulated opposition to perpetual liberalism, especially from a figure with the 
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national standing of Goldwater. That carefully crafted message was never developed 
though, and Goldwater’s philosophical overtures were neither recognized nor 
accepted. Steadfastly independent, Goldwater despised the constraints that were put 
on presidential candidates and refused to be controlled or suffocated. “We’re not 
going to have that kind of crap in this campaign,” Goldwater snapped when Lee 
Edwards suggested showcasing the senator’s personal life and hobbies.6 There is a 
certain appeal that accompanies that desire to break the mold, but Goldwater ignored 
traditional strategy and refused to replace it with an effective alternative. Dragging 
his feet through every step of the process, Goldwater remained reluctant throughout 
the yearlong effort and when he was finally driven to actively campaign he only 
damaged his standing. Goldwater’s shoot-from-the-hip verbiage was so poorly 
controlled that he often repeated gaffes he knew were destructive. Goldwater had 
neither the patience nor the desire to spend the time softening and perfecting his 
message. To do so would have been to acquiesce, in his view, to the pressures of a 
campaign based on personalities. Ironically, despite his insistence of a campaign 
based on principles, Goldwater’s failure was indelibly linked to personality.  
In 1952 and 1958 though, the same Goldwater had been corralled. Stephen 
Shadegg, the campaign manager in both of those difficult Senate campaigns, had 
carefully crafted Goldwater’s message and compelled the candidate to remain 
focused. In 1952, Goldwater rarely strayed from his message linking Ernest 
McFarland to the unpopular incumbent president and, six years later, Goldwater 
employed the same meticulous attack as the narrative switched to the danger of labor 
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unions. The campaign team of 1964 was unable to replicate Shadegg’s mastery. 
Inexperienced, unskilled and unqualified, the “Arizona Mafia” failed to provide the 
background campaign apparatus that had always made Goldwater stronger. 
Moreover, while Kitchel, Baroody, Burch and Kleindheist clearly could not organize 
a national effort, they refused help from those who could. In the name of purity, they 
purged the intellectuals, the experts and the party elders from the campaign. The 
result was ensured destruction and, coupled with Goldwater’s irate personality, was 
the ultimate failure. 
This complex of variables more completely explains the Goldwater defeat 
than simply ideology. To relegate the landslide loss to conservatism simply fails to 
account for the more nuanced issues within the campaign. Regardless of what 
Goldwater may have hoped, the 1964 presidential election became very literally a 
campaign of personalities, not principles, which can be attributed to the poor choices 
made by Goldwater and his organization. As the conservative ideology grows, 
matures and evolves over generations it can learn from the missteps of the Goldwater 
candidacy. 
On January 21, 2014, Rob Astorino entered a room of New York State 
Republican county chairmen and local notables. The 47-year-old Republican County 
Executive had been flirting with a run for governor for months, fresh off a double-
digit reelection victory in deep-blue Westchester. “In all my life,” he told the anxious 
crowd, “I have never seen a finer group of extremists in one room.”7 The remark was 
in response to comments made days earlier by Astorino’s would-be opponent, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jon Campbell, “Rob Astorino greets ‘extremists’ at GOP fundraiser,” Democrat & Chronicle, 
January 21, 2014. 
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Governor Andrew M. Cuomo. During an interview on public radio’s “The Capitol 
Pressroom,” Cuomo stated, “If they are extreme conservatives, they have no place in 
the state of New York.”8  While the “extremists” of 2014 are far different from those 
of 1964, the similarities to Goldwater should be obvious.  
 Conservatives of today bear little resemblance to the Goldwater activists, the 
original and true conservatives. In 1964, social issues never entered the political 
arena, and Goldwater himself refused to take a stance on abortion or homosexuality 
until much later in his career. Even then, Goldwater remained steadfastly devoted to 
the basic elements of his conservative philosophy, which stressed the freedom of the 
individual to live without the intrusion of government instruction. Under those 
guidelines, freedom of choice to either have an abortion or marry a person of the 
same-sex seemed natural conclusions. By the 1980s, with the rise of the “Religious 
Right,” Goldwater became isolated from the movement he helped to establish as 
modern conservatives adopted rigid social standards under the banner of “family 
values” and injected them into the hearts of Republican Party politics.  
Goldwater was so disgusted with this new brand of “conservatives” taking 
direction from a new authority, namely religious leaders like Jerry Falwell, that he 
remarked, “All good Christian ought to kick Jerry Falwell right in the ass.”9 Asked in 
a follow-up interview if he would stand by his remarks, Goldwater clarified that upon 
further reflection he may aim a little higher.10 Like Falwell, Goldwater had stressed 
morality in 1964, but in a different sense, purporting the importance of government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tom Precious, “Cuomo: No place in New York for ‘extremist’ conservative politicians,” Buffalo 
News, January 17, 2014.	  
9 Michael Murphy, “Conservative pioneer became an outcast,” Arizona Republic, May 31, 1998. 
10 Julie Anderson, Mr. Conservative: Goldwater on Goldwater (2006; Sweet Pea Films, 2007), Film. 
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free from self-serving corruption as opposed to sin-free personal lives. Conservatism 
under Goldwater emphasized a simple ideology that stressed the power of the 
individual, but the modern conservatism blended with religious fervor stressed 
doctrine that seemed to eliminate the fundamental importance of individual decision-
making and violate the right of personal freedom. While some believe that Goldwater 
became a liberal as he grew older, others believe he never changed, rather the 
political environment changed around him. Of these, the latter is most plausible. 
Goldwater was a simple, devoted ideologue, which he painfully proved during his 
presidential campaign. 
 Equally important to modern conservatism is that the lessons of his candidacy 
are alive and well in our own time. The Republican Party remains divided between 
the “establishment” and the “grass-roots,” as well as between libertarian and social 
conservatives, and the deep divisions often lead to embarrassing defeats in friendly 
political territory. In 2010 and 2012, Republicans lost U.S. Senate elections in 
relatively conservative states because of flawed candidates who had emerged from a 
primary process buoyed by the grassroots. These candidates simply did not have the 
organizational resources or the well-articulated messaging to compete with their 
careful Democratic opponents. Losing races such as Delaware and Colorado in 2010 
and Missouri and Indiana in 2012 cost Republicans control of the United States 
Senate, stalling the chance to press a Republican legislative agenda. Intraparty 
feuding remains an important strategic problem for Republicans and will require 
serious cooperation to strengthen and unite the divergent wings of the party, a 
continuation of a problem that plagued Goldwater. As Astorino and other 
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conservatives chart their courses for future campaigns, the 1964 Goldwater campaign 
provides important lessons and considerable inspiration. The conservative ideology 
must not be portrayed as radical, out-of-touch or extremist. Instead, conservatives 
must soften and articulate the ideology, drawing lessons from Goldwater’s mistakes, 
as Ronald Reagan did in 1980. 
 In 1970, Goldwater wrote to Alf Landon, the 1936 Republican presidential 
nominee. “Last night the thought came to me that there are three of us in this world in 
a rather unique position,” he said to his predecessor, “namely, we are the only ones 
around who have run for the Presidency and didn’t make it.” The third was Thomas 
Dewey, Republican nominee in 1944 and 1948. Goldwater requested an autographed 
photo of Landon, so that “I might have the three of us properly mounted for the 
purpose of bragging to my grandchildren.”11 While Barry Goldwater had never truly 
wanted to be president of the United States, he was particularly proud of leading the 
conservative movement. The faith of twenty-seven million Americans sustained him 
personally, and was enough to keep conservatism alive as a legitimate political 
philosophy. Only four years later, Richard Nixon would employ many Goldwater 
themes in his winning election, including a focus on moral government, law and order 
issues and converting southern votes.  
 Among the most interesting aspects of Barry Goldwater’s presidential 
campaign, and his larger career, is the power of personality. Goldwater was a disciple 
of his own philosophy and saw the world in stark realities, describing those realities 
in equally stark terms. While that behavior often led to his most serious political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Goldwater to Alf Landon, August 7, 1970, Folder 13, Box 12, The Personal and Political Papers of 
Senator Barry M. Goldwater, Arizona Historical Society, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. 
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quandaries, Goldwater’s style is nonetheless endearing. With distrust of Washington 
rising to new levels (In February 2014, Congress’ approval rating stood at 8 percent), 
the straightforward honesty of Barry Goldwater seems an auld lang syne novelty, 
representative of a bygone era.12 Goldwater never viewed his political career as 
anything different than service to his nation. In fact, he only agreed to run for 
president in 1964 because of his deep belief in personal duty and responsibility. 
Again, these are traits that appear to be largely absent in modern politics. 
Even as he railed against members of his own party, endorsing a Democrat for 
Congress against an evangelist Republican in 1994 and defending Bill Clinton during 
the Whitewater scandal, Goldwater remained widely respected. “I am often asked by 
people inside Arizona, and outside of Arizona, about Barry,” John McCain, 
Goldwater’s successor in the Senate, told the Washington Post. “I always say that 
Barry Goldwater has the right to say whatever he wants to,” McCain continued, “He 
has made his contribution, which transformed the Republican Party from an Eastern 
elitist organization to the breeding ground for the election of Ronald Reagan.”13 
Above all, Goldwater’s legacy is evidence that an individual can make a difference 
and that the power of an individual should never be underestimated. Inspired by the 
independent spirit of his mother, Barry Goldwater worked throughout his professional 
life to inspire that fiery independence in the American people. It was a belief central 
to his political doctrine, evident throughout his own personal life and one which 
sparked a national movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “Congressional Performance: 8% Think Congress Is Doing A Good Or Excellent Job,” Rasmussen 
Reports, February 18, 2014.	  
13 Lloyd Grove, “Barry Goldwater’s Left Turn,” Washington Post, July 28, 1994, C01. 
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